The Founders' Constitution
Volume 3, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 7, Document 2
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_1_7s2.html
The University of Chicago Press
Article 2, Section 1, Clause 7
Document 2
Records of the Federal Convention
[1:21; Madison, 29 May]
7. Resd. that a National Executive be instituted; to be chosen by the National Legislature for the term of years, to receive punctually at stated times, a fixed compensation for the services rendered, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the Magistracy, existing at the time of increase or diminution,
[1:81; Madison, 2 June]
Docr. Franklin moved that what related to the compensation for the services of the Executive be postponed, in order to substitute--"whose necessary expences shall be defrayed, but who shall receive no salary, stipend fee or reward whatsoever for their services"--He said that being very sensible of the effect of age on his memory, he had been unwilling to trust to that for the observations which seemed to support his motion, and had reduced them to writing, that he might with the permission of the Committee, read instead of speaking them. Mr. Wilson made an offer to read the paper, which was accepted--
The following is a literal copy of the paper.
Sir.
It is with reluctance that I rise to express a disapprobation of any one article of the plan for which we are so much obliged to the honorable gentleman who laid it before us. From its first reading I have borne a good will to it, and in general wished it success. In this particular of salaries to the Executive branch I happen to differ; and as my opinion may appear new and chimerical, it is only from a persuasion that it is right, and from a sense of duty that I hazard it. The Committee will judge of my reasons when they have heard them, and their judgment may possibly change mine.--I think I see inconveniences in the appointment of salaries; I see none in refusing them, but on the contrary, great advantages.
Sir, there are two passions which have a powerful influence on the affairs of men. These are ambition and avarice; the love of power, and the love of money. Separately each of these has great force in prompting men to action; but when united in view of the same object, they have in many minds the most violent effects. place before the eyes of such men a post of honour that shall at the same time be a place of profit, and they will move heaven and earth to obtain it. The vast number of such places it is that renders the British Government so tempestuous. The struggles for them are the true sources of all those factions which are perpetually dividing the Nation, distracting its councils, hurrying sometimes into fruitless & mischievous wars, and often compelling a submission to dishonorable terms of peace.
And of what kind are the men that will strive for this profitable pre-eminence, through all the bustle of cabal, the heat of contention, the infinite mutual abuse of parties, tearing to pieces the best of characters? It will not be the wise and moderate, the lovers of peace and good order, the men fittest for the trust. It will be the bold and the violent, the men of strong passions and indefatigable activity in their selfish pursuits. These will thrust themselves into your Government and be your rulers. And these too will be mistaken in the expected happiness of their situation: For their vanquished competitors of the same spirit, and from the same motives will perpetually be endeavouring to distress their administration, thwart their measures, and render them odious to the people.
Besides these evils, Sir, tho' we may set out in the beginning with moderate salaries, we shall find that such will not be of long continuance. Reasons will never be wanting for proposed augmentations. And there will always be a party for giving more to the rulers, that the rulers may be able in return to give more to them.--Hence as all history informs us, there has been in every State & Kingdom a constant kind of warfare between the Governing & Governed: the one striving to obtain more for its support, and the other to pay less. And this has alone occasioned great convulsions, actual civil wars, ending either in dethroning of the Princes or enslaving of the people. Generally indeed the ruling power carries its point, the revenues of princes constantly increasing, and we see that they are never satisfied, but always in want of more. The more the people are discontented with the oppression of taxes; the greater need the prince has of money to distribute among his partizans and pay the troops that are to suppress all resistance, and enable him to plunder at pleasure. There is scarce a king in a hundred who would not, if he could, follow the example of Pharoah, get first all the peoples money, then all their lands, and then make them and their children servants forever. It will be said, that we don't propose to establish Kings. I know it. But there is a natural inclination in mankind to Kingly Government. It sometimes relieves them from Aristocratic domination. They had rather have one tyrant than five hundred. It gives more of the appearance of equality among Citizens, and that they like. I am apprehensive therefore, perhaps too apprehensive, that the Government of these States, may in future times, end in a Monarchy. But this Catastrophe I think may be long delayed, if in our proposed system we do not sow the seeds of contention, faction & tumult, by making our posts of honor, places of profit. If we do, I fear that tho' we do employ at first a number, and not a single person, the number will in time be set aside, it will only nourish the foetus of a King, as the honorable gentleman from Virginia very aptly expressed it, and a King will the sooner be set over us.
It may be imagined by some that this is an Utopian Idea, and that we can never find men to serve us in the Executive department, without paying them well for their services. I conceive this to be a mistake. Some existing facts present themselves to me, which incline me to a contrary opinion. The high Sheriff of a County in England is an honorable office, but it is not a profitable one. It is rather expensive and therefore not sought for. But yet, it is executed and well executed, and usually by some of the principal Gentlemen of the County. In France the office of Counsellor or Member of their Judiciary Parliaments is more honorable. It is therefore purchased at a high price: There are indeed fees on the law proceedings, which are divided among them, but these fees do not amount to more than three per Cent on the sum paid for the place. Therefore as legal interest is there at five per Ct. they in fact pay two per Ct. for being allowed to do the Judiciary business of the Nation, which is at the same time entirely exempt from the burden of paying them any salaries for their services. I do not however mean to recommend this as an eligible mode for our Judiciary department. I only bring the instance to shew that the pleasure of doing good & serving their Country and the respect such conduct entitles them to, are sufficient motives with some minds to give up a great portion of their time to the Public, without the mean inducement of pecuniary satisfaction.
Another instance is that of a respectable Society who have made the experiment, and practiced it with success more than an hundred years. I mean the Quakers. It is an established rule with them, that they are not to go to law; but in their controversies they must apply to their monthly, quarterly and yearly meetings. Committees of these sit with patience to hear the parties, and spend much time in composing their differences. In doing this they are supported by a sense of duty, and the respect paid to usefulness. It is honorable to be so employed, but it was never made profitable by salaries, fees, or perquisites. And indeed in all cases of public service the less the profit the greater the honor.
To bring the matter nearer home, have we not seen the great and most important of our officers, that of General of our armies executed for eight years together without the smallest salary, by a Patriot whom I will not now offend by any other praise; and this through fatigues and distresses in common with the other brave men his military friends & companions, and the constant anxieties peculiar to his station? And shall we doubt finding three or four men in all the U. States, with public spirit enough to bear sitting in peaceful Council for perhaps an equal term, merely to preside over our civil concerns, and see that our laws are duly executed. Sir, I have a better opinion of our country. I think we shall never be without a sufficient number of wise and good men to undertake and execute well and faithfully the Office in question.
Sir, The saving of the salaries that may at first be proposed is not an object with me. The subsequent mischiefs of proposing them are what I apprehend. And therefore it is that I move the amendment. If it is not seconded or accepted I must be contented with the satisfaction of having delivered my opinion frankly and done my duty.
The motion was seconded by Col. Hamilton with the view he said merely of bringing so respectable a proposition before the Committee, and which was besides enforced by arguments that a certain degree of weight. No debate ensued, and the proposition was postponed for the consideration of the members. It was treated with great respect, but rather for the author of it, than from any apparent conviction of its expediency or practicability.
[1:236; Madison, 13 June]
9. Resolved that a National Executive be instituted . . . to receive a fixed stipend by which he may be compensated for the devotion of his time to public service to be paid out of the national Treasury.
[1:244; Madison, 15 June]
4. Resd. that the U. States in Congs. be authorized to elect a federal Executive to consist of persons, to continue in office for the term of years, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons composing the Executive at the time of such increase or diminution, to be paid out of the federal treasury,
[2:61; Journal, 20 July]
It was moved and seconded to agree to the following clause namely
"to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to public service"
which passed unan: in the affirmative [Ayes--10; noes--0.]
It was moved and seconded to agree to the following clause, namely
"to be paid out of the national Treasury"
which passed unan: in the affirmative [Ayes--10; noes--0.]
[2:121; Madison, 26 July]
[That a national executive be instituted] . . . to receive a fixt compensation for the devotion of his time to the public service, to be paid out of the Natl. Treasury"--it passed in the affirmative
N. H. ay. Mas. not on floor. Ct. ay. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. divd. Mr. Blair & Col. Mason ay. Genl. Washington & Mr Madison no. Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House. N.-- C-- ay. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes--6; noes--3; divided--1; absent--1.]
[2:132, 134, 146, 172; Committee of Detail]
to receive a fixed Compensation for the Devotion of his Time to public Service--to be paid out of the public Treasury.
. . . . .
7. to receive a fixed compensation for the devotion of his time to public service the quantum of which shall be settled by the national legislature to be paid out of the national treasury no Increase or decrease during the Term of Service of the Executive
. . . . .
He shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a fixed Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during his Continuance in Office.
[2:335; Journal, 20 Aug.]
No person holding the Office of President of the United States,--a Judge of their supreme Court--Secretary for the Department of foreign affairs--of Finance--of Marine--of War--or of
shall be capable of holding at the same time any other office of trust or emolument under the United States, or an individual State.
[2:575, 599; Committee of Style]
He shall, at stated times, receive for his services, a compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during his continuance in office.
. . . . .
(f) The president shall, at stated times, receive a fixed compensation for his services, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected.
[2:626; Madison, 15 Sept.]
Mr. Rutlidge and Docr Franklin moved to annex to the end paragraph 7. sect. 1. art II--"and he (the President) shall not receive, within that period, any other emolument from the U. S. or any of them." on which question
N--H. ay--Mas. ay. Ct. no. N. J. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md. ay--Va. ay. N. C. no. S--C. ay. Geo--ay. [Ayes--7; noes--4.]
[2:636; Mason, 15 Sept.]
In the 7th clause of the 1st section of the 2nd Article--strike out the words during the period for which he shall have been elected--and instead of them insert--so as in any manner to affect the person in office at the time of such increase or diminution.
The Founders' Constitution
Volume 3, Article 2, Section 1, Clause 7, Document 2
http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_1_7s2.html
The University of Chicago Press
Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Rev. ed. 4 vols. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1937.
