Article 2, Section 2, Clause 1
A Georgian15 Nov. 1787Storing 5.9.10
Art. 2, sect. 2. If the president should at any time be incompetent for military command in war, etc. (for he cannot be prevented from taking the chief command when it is his right) and should choose to take the command notwithstanding, what ill consequences may not result? for we know there are many wise and good men, and very fit for civil rulers, but are quite unfit for the command of armies and navies. Would it not be better said, "That the president, with the advice of both Houses of Congress, shall be commander in chief, etc. etc. etc." By this clause, ought we not to look into the troubles in Holland, and see how the Stadtholder (laying aside his hereditary claims) behaved, contrary to the positive orders of the States General, his masters, during our late glorious revolution? and has he not accumulated powers destructive to their commonwealth, and which are now the sole cause of their present troubles? and should we not avoid the like by making the president ineligible to the office as many years as you allow him to hold it? and that he only be commander in chief, and nominate and appoint all officers, civil and military, by and with the advice of the senate, etc. only? Therefore I would advise the clause, "But the Congress may by law vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper in the president alone," etc. be struck out.
Storing, Herbert J., ed. The Complete Anti-Federalist. 7 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.
© 1987 by The University of Chicago