Article 3, Section 1
Records of the Federal Convention
[1:21; Madison, 29 May]
9. Resd. that a National Judiciary be established to consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature, to hold their offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually at stated times fixed compensation for their services, in which no increase or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution. that the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunals shall be to hear & determine in the first instance, and of the supreme tribunal to hear and determine in the dernier resort, all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested, or which respect the collection of the National revenue; impeachments of any National officers, and questions which may involve the national peace and harmony.
[1:95; Journal, 4 June]
It was then moved and seconded to proceed to the consideration of the 9th resolution submitted by Mr Randolph
When on motion to agree to the first clause namely
"resolved that a national judiciary be established"
it passed in the affirmative
It was then moved and seconded to add these words to the first clause of the ninth resolution namely
"to consist of One supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals.
and on the question to agree to the same.
it passed in the affirmative.
[1:115; Journal, 5 June]
It was moved and seconded to proceed to the further considn of the 9th resolution, submitted by Mr. Randolph.
It was then moved and seconded to amend the last clause by striking out the words "One or more" so as to read "and of inferior to tribunals"
and on the question to strike out
it passed in the affirmative
It was then moved and seconded to strike out the words "the national legislature" so as to read
to be appointed by.
On the question to strike out
it passed in the affirmative [Ayes--8; noes--2.]
Notice was given by Mr. Wilson that he should at a future day move for a reconsideration of that clause which respects "inferior tribunals"
Mr. C. Pinckney gave notice that when the clause which respects the appointment of the Judiciary came before the Committee he should move to restore the words
"the national legislature"
It was then moved and seconded to agree to the following part of the 9th resolution namely.
"To hold their offices during good behaviour and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services, in which no encrease or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such encrease or diminution"
and on the question to agree to the same
it passed in the affirmative
It was then moved and seconded to postpone the remaining clause of the 9th resolution
and on the question to postpone
it passed in the affirmative
. . . . .
It was moved by Mr Rutledge seconded by Mr. Sherman
To strike out the following words in the 9th resolution submitted by Mr Randolph namely
"and of inferior tribunals"
And on the question to strike out
it passed in the affirmative [Ayes--5; noes--4; divided--2.]
[1:124; Madison, 5 June]
Mr. Rutlidge havg. obtained a rule for reconsideration of the clause for establishing inferior tribunals under the national authority, now moved that that part of the clause in propos. 9. should be expunged: arguing that the State Tribunals might and ought to be left in all cases to decide in the first instance the right of appeal to the supreme national tribunal being sufficient to secure the national rights & uniformity of Judgmts: that it was making an unnecessary encroachment on the jurisdiction of the States, and creating unnecessary obstacles to their adoption of the new system.--Mr. Sherman 2ded. the motion.
Mr. Madison observed that unless inferior tribunals were dispersed throughout the Republic with final jurisdiction in many cases, appeals would be multiplied to a most oppressive degree; that besides, an appeal would not in many cases be a remedy. What was to be done after improper Verdicts in State tribunals obtained under the biassed directions of a dependent Judge, or the local prejudices of an undirected jury? To remand the cause for a new trial would answer no purpose. To order a new trial at the supreme bar would oblige the parties to bring up their witnesses, tho' ever so distant from the seat of the Court. An effective Judiciary establishment commensurate to the legislative authority, was essential. A Government without a proper Executive & Judiciary would be the mere trunk of a body without arms or legs to act or move.
Mr. Wilson opposed the motion on like grounds. he said the admiralty jurisdiction ought to be given wholly to the national Government, as it related to cases not within the jurisdiction of particular states, & to a scene in which controversies with foreigners would be most likely to happen.
Mr. Sherman was in favor of the motion. He dwelt chiefly on the supposed expensiveness of having a new set of Courts, when the existing State Courts would answer the same purpose.
Mr. Dickinson contended strongly that if there was to be a National Legislature, there ought to be a national Judiciary, and that the former ought to have authority to institute the latter.
On the question for Mr. Rutlidge's motion to strike out "inferior tribunals"
Massts. divided, Cont. ay. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. no. Del. no. Md. no. Va. no. N. C. ay. S. C. ay. Geo ay [Ayes--5; noes--4; divided--2.]
Mr. Wilson & Mr. Madison then moved, in pursuance of the idea expressed above by Mr. Dickinson, to add to Resol: 9. the words following "that the National Legislature be empowered to institute inferior tribunals". They observed that there was a distinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to the Legislature to establish or not establish them. They repeated the necessity of some such provision.
Mr. Butler. The people will not bear such innovations. The States will revolt at such encroachments. Supposing such an establishment to be useful, we must not venture on it. We must follow the example of Solon who gave the Athenians not the best Govt. he could devise; but the best they wd. receive.
Mr. King remarked as to the comparative expence that the establishment of inferior tribunals wd. cost infinitely less than the appeals that would be prevented by them.
On this question as moved by Mr. W. and Mr. M.
Mass. ay. Ct. no. N. Y. divd. N. J. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. ay. S. C. no. Geo. ay. [Ayes--8; noes--2; divided--1.]
[1:126; Yates, 5 June]
The 9th resolve, That a national judicial be established to consist of one supreme tribunal, and of inferior tribunals, to hold their offices during good behaviour, and no augmentation or diminution in the stipends during the time of holding their offices. Agreed to.
Mr. Wilson moved that the judicial be appointed by the executive, instead of the national legislature.
Mr Madison opposed the motion, and inclined to think that the executive ought by no means to make the appointments, but rather that branch of the legislature called the senatorial; and moves that the words, of the appointment of the legislature, be expunged.
. . . . .
Question on the 9th resolve to strike out the words, and of inferior tribunals.
Carried by 5 states against 4--2 states divided, of which last number New-York was one.
Mr. Wilson then moved, that the national legislature shall have the authority to appoint inferior tribunals, be added to the resolve.
Carried by 7 states against 3. New-York divided. (N. B. Mr. Lansing from New-York was prevented by sickness from attending this day.)
[1:127; King, 5 June]
Rutledge proposes to have a supreme Tribunal to be appointed by the Genl. Govt. but no subordinate Tribunals--except those already in the several States--Wilson agt. it--Dickerson--agt. Wilson the State and Genl. Tribunals will interfere--we want a National Judicial--let it be entire and originate from the Genl. Govt.
Madison proposes to vest the Genl. Govt. with authority to erect an Independent Judicial, coextensive wt. ye. Nation--
5 A. 4 No. 2 divd.
[1:128; Pierce, 5 June]
Mr. Rutledge was of opinion that it would be right to make the adjudications of the State Judges, appealable to the national Judicial.
Mr. Madison was for appointing the Judges by the Senate.
Mr. Hamilton suggested the idea of the Executive's appointing or nominating the Judges to the Senate which should have the right of rejecting or approving.
[1:226; Journal, 13 June]
Resolved that a national Judiciary be established to consist of
One supreme tribunal
To hold their Offices during good behaviour; and to receive punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services; in which no encrease or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in Office at the time of such encrease or diminution.
Resolved that the national Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior Tribunals.
. . . . .
11 Resolved. that a national Judiciary be established to consist of
One supreme Tribunal
The Judges of which to be appointed by the second Branch of the National Legislature.
to hold their offices during good behaviour
to receive, punctually, at stated times, a fixed compensation for their services: in which no encrease or diminution shall be made so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such encrease or diminution
12 Resolved. That the national Legislature be empowered to appoint
[1:238; Yates, 13 June]
It was further agreed, that the judiciary be paid out of the national treasury.
[1:244; Madison, 15 June]
5. Resd. that a federal Judiciary be established to consist of a supreme Tribunal the Judges of which to be appointed by the Executive, & to hold their offices during good behaviour, to receive punctually at stated times a fixed compensation for their services in which no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such increase or diminution;
[2:37; Journal, 18 July]
On the question to agree to the following clause of the 11th resolution namely
"That a national Judiciary be established"
it passed unanimously in the affirmative
On the question to agree to the following clause of the 11th resolution namely
"To consist of One supreme Tribunal
it passed unanimously in the affirmative
It was moved and seconded to strike out the words
"second branch of the national Legislature" and to insert the words "national executive" in the 11. resolution
which passed in the negative. [Ayes--2; noes--6.]
[2:41; Madison, 18 July]
Resol. 11. "that a Natl. Judiciary be estabd. to consist of one supreme tribunal." agd. to nem. con.
"The Judges of which to be appointd. by the 2d. branch of the Natl. Legislature."
Mr. Ghorum, wd. prefer an appointment by the 2d branch to an appointmt. by the whole Legislature; but he thought even that branch too numerous, and too little personally responsible, to ensure a good choice. He suggested that the Judges be appointed by the Execuve. with the advice & consent of the 2d branch, in the mode prescribed by the constitution of Masts. This mode had been long practised in that country, & was found to answer perfectly well.
Mr. Wilson, still wd. prefer an an appointmt. by the Executive; but if that could not be attained, wd. prefer in the next place, the mode suggested by Mr. Ghorum. He thought it his duty however to move in the first instance "that the Judges be appointed by the Executive." Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion.
Mr. L. Martin was strenuous for an appt. by the 2d. branch. Being taken from all the States it wd. be best informed of characters & most capable of making a fit choice.
Mr. Sherman concurred in the observations of Mr. Martin, adding that the Judges ought to be diffused, which would be more likely to be attended to by the 2d. branch, than by the Executive.
Mr. Mason. The mode of appointing the Judges may depend in some degree on the mode of trying impeachments, of the Executive. If the Judges were to form a tribunal for that purpose, they surely ought not to be appointed by the Executive. There were insuperable objections besides agst. referring the appointment to the Executive. He mentioned as one, that as the seat of Govt. must be in some one State, and the Executive would remain in office for a considerable time, for 4, 5, or 6 years at least he would insensibly form local & personal attachments within the particular State that would deprive equal merit elsewhere, of an equal chance of promotion.
Mr. Ghorum. As the Executive will be responsible in point of character at least, for a judicious and faithful discharge of his trust, he will be careful to look through all the States for proper characters.--The Senators will be as likely to form their attachments at the seat of Govt where they reside, as the Executive. If they can not get the man of the particular State to which they may respectively belong, they will be indifferent to the rest. Public bodies feel no personal responsibly and give full play to intrigue & cabal. Rh. Island is a full illustration of the insensibility to character produced by a participation of numbers, in dishonorable measures, and of the length to which a public body may carry wickedness & cabal.
Mr. Govr. Morris supposed it would be improper for an impeachmt. of the Executive to be tried before the Judges. The latter would in such case be drawn into intrigues with the Legislature and an impartial trial would be frustrated. As they wd. be much about the seat of Govt they might even be previously consulted & arrangements might be made for a prosecution of the Executive. He thought therefore that no argument could be drawn from the probability of such a plan of impeachments agst. the motion before the House.
Mr. Madison, suggested that the Judges might be appointed by the Executives with the concurrence of 1/3 at least of the 2d. branch. This would unite the advantage of responsibility in the Executive with the security afforded in the 2d. branch agst. any incautious or corrupt nomination by the Executive.
Mr. Sherman, was clearly for an election by the Senate. It would be composed of men nearly equal to the Executive, and would of course have on the whole more wisdom. They would bring into their deliberations a more diffusive knowledge of characters. It would be less easy for candidates to intrigue with them, than with the Executive Magistrate. For these reasons he thought there would be a better security for a proper choice in the Senate than in the Executive.
Mr. Randolph. It is true that when the appt. of the Judges was vested in the 2d. branch an equality of votes had not been given to it. Yet he had rather leave the appointmt. there than give it to the Executive. He thought the advantage of personal responsibility might be gained in the Senate by requiring the respective votes of the members to be entered on the Journal. He thought too that the hope of receiving appts. would be more diffusive if they depended on the Senate, the members of which wd. be diffusively known, than if they depended on a single man who could not be personally known to a very great extent; and consequently that opposition to the System, would be so far weakened.
Mr. Bedford thought there were solid reasons agst. leaving the appointment to the Executive. He must trust more to information than the Senate. It would put it in his power to gain over the larger States, by gratifying them with a preference of their Citizens. The responsibility of the Executive so much talked of was chimerical. He could not be punished for mistakes.
Mr. Ghorum remarked that the Senate could have no better information than the Executive. They must like him, trust to information from the members belonging to the particular State where the Candidate resided. The Executive would certainly be more answerable for a good appointment, as the whole blame of a bad one would fall on him alone. He did not mean that he would be answerable under any other penalty than that of public censure, which with honorable minds was a sufficient one.
On the question for referring the appointment of the Judges to the Executive, instead of the 2d. branch
Mas. ay. Cont. no. Pa. ay. Del. no. Md. no Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. no--Geo. absent. [Ayes--2; noes--6; absent--1.]
Mr. Ghorum moved "that the Judges be nominated and appointed by the Executive, by & with the advice & consent of the 2d branch & every such nomination shall be made at least days prior to such appointment". This mode he said had been ratified by the experience of 140 years in Massachussts. If the appt. should be left to either branch of the Legislature, it will be a mere piece of jobbing.
Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. & supported the motion.
Mr. Sherman thought it less objectionable than an absolute appointment by the Executive; but disliked it as too much fettering the Senate.
Question on Mr. Ghorum's motion
Mas. ay. Con. no. Pa ay. Del. no. Md. ay. Va. ay. N. C. no. S. C. no. Geo. absent. [Ayes--4; noes--4; absent--1.]
Mr. Madison moved that the Judges should be nominated by the Executive, & such nomination should become an appointment if not disagreed to within days by 2/3 of the 2d. branch. Mr. Govr. Morris 2ded. the motion. By common consent the consideration of it was postponed till tomorrow.
"To hold their offices during good behaviour" & "to receive fixed salaries" agreed to nem: con:
"In which (salaries of Judges) no increase or diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons at the time in office."
Mr. Govr. Morris moved to strike out "or increase". He thought the Legislature ought to be at liberty to increase salaries as circumstances might require, and that this would not create any improper dependence in the Judges.
Docr. Franklin was in favor of the motion, Money may not only become plentier, but the business of the department may increase as the Country becomes more populous.
Mr. Madison. The dependence will be less if the increase alone should be permitted, but it will be improper even so far to permit a dependence Whenever an increase is wished by the Judges, or may be in agitation in the legislature, an undue complaisance in the former may be felt towards the latter. If at such a crisis there should be in Court suits to which leading members of the Legislature may be parties, the Judges will be in a situation which ought not to suffered, if it can be prevented. The variations in the value of money, may be guarded agst. by taking for a standard wheat or some other thing of permanent value. The increase of business will be provided for by an increase of the number who are to do it. An increase of salaries may be easily so contrived as not to effect persons in office.
Mr. Govr. Morris. The value of money may not only alter but the State of Society may alter. In this event the same quantity of wheat, the same value would not be the same compensation. The Amount of salaries must always be regulated by the manners & the style of living in a Country. The increase of business can not be provided for in the supreme tribunal in the way that has been mentioned. All the business of a certain description whether more or less must be done in that single tribunal--Additional labor alone in the Judges can provide for additional business. Additional compensation therefore ought not to be prohibited.
On the question for striking out "or increase"
Mas. ay. Cont. ay. Pa. ay. Del. ay. Md. ay. Va. no. N. C. no. S. C. ay. Geo. absent [Ayes--6; noes--2; absent--1.] The whole clause as amended was then agreed to nem: con:
12. Resol: "that Natl. Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior tribunals"
Mr. Butler could see no necessity for such tribunals. The State Tribunals might do the business.
Mr. L. Martin concurred. They will create jealousies & oppositions in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere.
Mr. Ghorum. There are in the States already federal Courts with jurisdiction for trial of piracies &c. committed on the Seas. no complaints have been made by the States or the Courts of the States. Inferior tribunals are essential to render the authority of the Natl. Legislature effectual
Mr. Randolph observed that the Courts of the States can not be trusted with the administration of the National laws. The objects of jurisdiction are such as will often place the General & local policy at variance.
Mr. Govr. Morris urged also the necessity of such a provision
Mr. Sherman was willing to give the power to the Legislature but wished them to make use of the State Tribunals whenever it could be done. with safety to the general interest.
Col. Mason thought many circumstances might arise not now to be foreseen, which might render such a power absolutely necessary.
On question for agreeing to 12. Resol: empowering the National Legislature to appoint "inferior tribunals". Agd. to nem. con.
[2:116; Journal, 26 July]
It was moved and seconded to agree to the following Resolution namely.
Resolved That it be an instruction to the Committee to whom were referred the proceedings of the Convention for the establishment of a national government, to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications of landed property and citizenship in the United States for the Executive, the Judiciary, and the Members of both branches of the Legislature of the United States; and for disqualifying all such persons as are indebted to, or have unsettled accounts with the United States from being Members of either Branch of the national Legislature.
It was moved and seconded to strike out the word "landed"
it passed in the affirmative [Ayes--10; noes--1.]
On the question to agree to the clause respecting the qualification as amended
it passed in the affirmative [Ayes--8; noes--3.]
It was moved and seconded to add the words "and Pensioners of the Government of the United States" to the clause of disqualification
which passed in the negative. [Ayes--3; noes--7; divided--1.]
It was moved and seconded to strike out the following words, namely
"or have unsettled accounts with"
which passed in the affirmative. [Ayes--9; noes--2.]
On the question to agree to the clause of disqualification as amended
it passed in the negative [Ayes--2; noes--9.]
[2:132, 146, 172; Committee of Detail, I, IV, IX]
Resolved That a national Judiciary be established to consist of one Supreme Tribunal--the Judges of which shall be appointed by the second Branch of the national Legislature--to hold their Offices during good Behaviour--to receive punctually at stated Times a fixed Compensation for their Services, in which no Diminution shall be made so as to affect the Persons actually in Office at the Time of such Diminution
. . . . .
5. The Judiciary
1. shall consist of one supreme tribunal
2. the judges whereof shall be appointed by the senate
3. and of such inferior tribunals, as the legislature may (appoint) establish
(4. the judges of which shall be also appointed by the senate--)
5. all the judges shall hold their offices during good behaviour;
6. and shall receive punctually,
at stated times
a (fixed) compensation for their services,
to be settled by the legislature
in which no diminution shall be made, so as to affect the persons actually in office at the time of such diminution.
and shall swear fidelity to the union.1
. . . . .
The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme (National) Court, and in such (other) inferior Courts as shall, from Time to Time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.
The Judges of the Supreme (National) Court shall (be chosen by the Senate by Ballott). (They shall) hold their Offices during good Behaviour. They shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.2
[2:186; Madison, 6 Aug.]
Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.
Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior Courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
[2:335; Journal, 20 Aug.]
No person holding the Office of President of the United States--a Judge of their supreme Court--Secretary for the Department of foreign affairs--of Finance--of Marine--of War--or of
shall be capable of holding at the same time any other office of trust or emolument under the United States, or an individual State.
[2:341; Madison, 20 Aug.]
"Each branch of the Legislature, as well as the Supreme Executive shall have authority to require the opinions of the supreme Judicial Court upon important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions"
[2:423; Journal, 27 Aug.]
On the question to agree to the 1st sect. 11 article as amended.
it passed in the affirmative. [Ayes--6; noes--2.]
It was moved and seconded to add the following clause after the word "behaviour" 2 section. 11 article
"Provided that they may be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate and House of representatives"
which passed in the negative [Ayes--1; noes--7.]
On the question to agree to the 2nd section of the 11 article as reported
it passed in the affirmative
It was moved and seconded to insert the words
"encreased or" before the word "diminished" in the 2nd section 11th article.
which passed in the negative. [Ayes--1; noes--5; divided--1.]
It was moved and seconded to add the following words to the 2nd section 11 article
"nor encreased by any act of the Legislature, which shall operate before the expiration of three years after the passing thereof."
which passed in the negative [Ayes--2; noes--5.]
[2:428; Madison, 27 Aug.]
Art: XI being taken up.
Docr. Johnson suggested that the judicial power ought to extend to equity as well as law--and moved to insert the words "both in law and equity" after the words "U. S." in the 1st line of sect. 1.
Mr. Read objected to vesting these powers in the same Court--
On the question
N. H. ay. Mas. absent Ct ay. N. J. abst P. ay--Del. no. Md no. Virga. ay. N--C--abst. S. C. ay. Geo. ay. [Ayes--6; noes--2; absent--3.]
On the question to agree to Sect. 1. art. XI. as amended
N--H--ay--Mas. abst. Ct. ay--Pa ay--N--J--abst Del. no. Md. no. Va. ay. N--C--abst S. C. ay Geo. ay. [Ayes--6; noes--2; absent--3.]
Mr. Dickinson moved as an amendment to sect. 2--art XI after the words "good behavior" the words "provided that they may be removed by the Executive on the application by the Senate and House of Representatives."
Mr. Gerry 2ded. the motion
Mr Govr. Morris thought it a contradiction in terms to say that the Judges should hold their offices during good behavior, and yet be removeable without a trial. Besides it was fundamentally wrong to subject Judges to so arbitrary an authority.
Mr. Sherman saw no contradiction or impropriety if this were made part of the Constitutional regulation of the Judiciary establishment. He observed that a like provision was contained in the British Statutes.
Mr. Rutlidge: If the supreme Court is to judge between the U. S. and particular States, this alone is an insuperable objection to the motion.
Mr. Wilson considered such a provision in the British Government as less dangerous than here, the House of Lords & House of Commons being less likely to concur on the same occasions. Chief Justice Holt, he remarked, had successively offended by his independent conduct, both houses of Parliament. Had this happened at the same time, he would have been ousted. The Judges would be in a bad situation if made to depend on every gust of faction which might prevail in the two branches of our Govt
Mr. Randolph opposed the motion as weakening too much the independence of the Judges.
Mr Dickinson was not apprehensive that the Legislature composed of different branches constructed on such different principles, would improperly unite for the purpose of displacing a Judge--
On the question for agreeing to Mr. Dickinson's Motion
N. H. no. Mas. abst Ct. ay. N. J. abst Pa. no. Del. no. Md no. Va. no N. C. abst. S--C--no--Geo--no. [Ayes--1; noes--7; absent--3.]
On the question on Sect. 2 art: XI as reported. Del. & Maryd. only no--
Mr. Madison & Mr. McHenry moved to reinstate the words "increased or" before the word "diminished" in the 2d. Sect: art XI.
Mr. Govr. Morris opposed it for reasons urged by him on a former occasion--
Col: Mason contended strenuously for the motion. There was no weight he said in the argument drawn from changes in the value of the metals, because this might be provided for by an increase of salaries so made as not to affect persons in office, and this was the only argument on which much stress seemed to have been laid.
Genl. Pinkney. The importance of the Judiciary will require men of the first talents: large salaries will therefore be necessary, larger than the U.S. can allow in the first instance. He was not satisfied with the expedient mentioned by Col: Mason. He did not think it would have a good effect or a good appearance, for new Judges to come in with higher salaries than the old ones.
Mr Govr Morris said the expedient might be evaded & therefore amounted to nothing. Judges might resign, & then be re-appointed to increased salaries.
On the question
N. H. no--Ct no. Pa no. Del. no--Md. divd Va ay--S. C. no--Geo. abst. also Masts--N. J. & N--C-- [Ayes--1; noes--5; divided--1; absent--4.]
Mr. Randolph & Mr. Madison then moved to add the following words to sect 2. art XI. "nor increased by any Act of the Legislature which shall operate before the expiration of three years after the passing thereof"
On this question
N. H. no. Ct. no--Pa. no. Del. no. Md ay--Va ay--S. C. no. Geo--abst also Mas. N. J. & N. C. [Ayes--2; noes--5; absent--4.]
[2:575, 600; Committee of Style]
Sect. 1. The Judicial Power of the United States both in law and equity shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such Inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the Legislature of the United States.
Sect. 2. The Judges of the Supreme Court, and of the Inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour. They shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
. . . . .
Sect. 1. The judicial power of the United States, both in law and equity, shall be vested in one supreme court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behaviour, and shall, at stated times, receive for their services, a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.
[2:638; Mason, 15 Sept.]
The Judiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended, as to absorb and destroy the judiciaries of the several States; thereby rendering law as tedious, intricate and expensive, and justice as unattainable, by a great part of the community, as in England, and enabling the rich to oppress and ruin the poor.
Farrand, Max, ed. The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787. Rev. ed. 4 vols. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1937.
© 1987 by The University of Chicago