Article 3, Section 3, Clauses 1 and 2
United States v. Burr25 Fed. Cas. 55, no. 14,693 C.C.D.Va. 1807
Marshall, Chief Justice, delivered the opinion of the court as follows:
The question now to be decided has been argued in a manner worthy of its importance, and with an earnestness evincing the strong conviction felt by the counsel on each side that the law is with them. A degree of eloquence seldom displayed on any occasion has embellished a solidity of argument and a depth of research by which the court has been greatly aided in forming the opinion it is about to deliver. The testimony adduced on the part of the United States to prove the overt act laid in the indictment having shown, and the attorney for the United States having admitted, that the prisoner was not present when that act, whatever may be its character, was committed, and there being no reason to doubt but that he was at a great distance, and in a different state, it is objected to the testimony offered on the part of the United States to connect him with those who committed the overt act, that such testimony is totally irrelevant, and must, therefore, be rejected. The arguments in support of this motion respect in part the merits of the case as it may be supposed to stand independent of the pleadings, and in part as exhibited by the pleadings.
On the first division of the subject two points are made: 1st. That, conformably to the constitution of the United States, no man can be convicted of treason who was not present when the war was levied. 2d. That if this construction be erroneous, no testimony can be received to charge one man with the overt acts of others until those overt acts as laid in the indictment be proved to the satisfaction of the court. The question which arises on the construction of the constitution, in every point of view in which it can be contemplated, is of infinite moment to the people of this country and to their government, and requires the most temperate and the most deliberate consideration. "Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them." What is the natural import of the words "levying war?" and who may be said to levy it? Had their first application to treason been made by our constitution they would certainly have admitted of some latitude of construction. Taken most literally, they are, perhaps, of the same import with the words "raising or creating war"; but as those who join after the commencement are equally the objects of punishment, there would probably be a general admission that the term also comprehended making war or carrying on war. In the construction which courts would be required to give these words, it is not improbable that those who should raise, create, make, or carry on war, might be comprehended. The various acts which would be considered as coming within the term would be settled by a course of decisions; and it would be affirming boldly to say that those only who actually constituted a portion of the military force appearing in arms could be considered as levying war. There is no difficulty in affirming that there must be a war or the crime of levying it cannot exist; but there would often be considerable difficulty in affirming that a particular act did or did not involve the person committing it in the guilt and in the fact of levying war. If, for example, an army should be actually raised for the avowed purpose of carrying on open war against the United States and subverting their government, the point must be weighed very deliberately, before a judge would venture to decide that an overt act of levying war had not been committed by a commissary of purchases, who never saw the army, but who, knowing its object, and leaguing himself with the rebels, supplied that army with provisions, or, by a recruiting officer holding a commission in the rebel service, who, though never in camp, executed the particular duty assigned to him.
But the term is not for the first time applied to treason by the constitution of the United States. It is a technical term. It is used in a very old statute of that country whose language is our language, and whose laws form the substratum of our laws. It is scarcely conceivable that the term was not employed by the framers of our constitution in the sense which had been affixed to it by those from whom we borrowed it. So far as the meaning of any terms, particularly terms of art, is completely ascertained, those by whom they are employed must be considered as employing them in that ascertained meaning, unless the contrary be proved by the context. It is, therefore, reasonable to suppose, unless it be incompatible with other expressions of the constitution, that the term "levying war" is used in that instrument in the same sense in which it was understood in England, and in this country, to have been used in the statute of the 25th of Edw. III. from which it was borrowed. It is said that this meaning is to be collected only from adjudged cases. But this position cannot be conceded to the extent in which it is laid down. The superior authority of adjudged cases will never be controverted. But those celebrated elementary writers who have stated the principles of the law, whose statements have received the common approbation of legal men, are not to be disregarded. Principles laid down by such writers as Coke, Hale, Foster, and Blackstone, are not lightly to be rejected. These books are in the hands of every student. Legal opinions are formed upon them; and those opinions are afterwards carried to the bar, the bench and the legislature. In the exposition of terms, therefore, used in instruments of the present day, the definitions and the dicta of those authors, if not contradicted by adjudications, and if compatible with the words of the statute, are entitled to respect. It is to be regretted that they do not shed as much light on this part of the subject as is to be wished. Coke does not give a complete definition of the term, but puts cases which amount to levying war. "An actual rebellion or insurrection, he says, is a levying of war." In whom? Coke does not say whether in those only who appear in arms, or in all those who take part in the rebellion or insurrection by real open deed. Hale, in treating on the same subject, puts many cases which shall constitute a levying of war, without which no act can amount to treason; but he does not particularize the parts to be performed by the different persons concerned in that war, which shall be sufficient to fix on each the guilt of levying it. Foster says: "The joining with rebels in an act of rebellion, or with enemies in acts of hostility, will make a man a traitor." "Furnishing rebels or enemies with money, arms, ammunition or other necessaries will prima facie make a man a traitor." Foster does not say that he would be a traitor under the words of the statute, independent of the legal rule which attaches the guilt of the principal to an accessory, nor that his treason is occasioned by that rule. In England this discrimination need not be made except for the purpose of framing the indictment; and, therefore, in the English books we do not perceive any effort to make it. Thus, surrendering a castle to rebels, being in confederacy with them, is said by Hale and Foster to be treason under the clause of levying war; but whether it be levying war in fact, or aiding those who levy it, is not said. Upon this point Blackstone is not more satisfactory. Although we find among the commentators upon treason enough to satisfy the inquiry, what is a state of internal war? yet no precise information can be acquired from them which would enable us to decide with clearness whether persons not in arms, but taking part in a rebellion, could be said to levy war, independently of that doctrine which attaches to the accessory the guilt of his principal. If in adjudged cases this question have been taken up and directly decided, the court has not seen those cases. The argument which may be drawn from the form of the indictment, though strong, is not conclusive. In the precedent found in Tremaine, Mary Speake, who was indicted for furnishing provisions to the party of the Duke of Monmouth, is indicted for furnishing provisions to those who were levying war, not for levying war herself. It may correctly be argued that, had this act amounted to levying war, she would have been indicted for levying war; and the furnishing of provisions would have been laid as the overt act. The court felt this when the precedent was produced. But the argument, though strong, is not conclusive, because, in England, the inquiry, whether she had become a traitor by levying war, or by giving aid and comfort to those who were levying war, was unimportant; and because, too, it does not appear from the indictment that she was actually concerned in the rebellion--that she belonged to the rebel party, or was guilty of anything further than a criminal speculation in selling them provisions.
It is not deemed necessary to trace the doctrine, that in treason all are principals, to its source. Its origin is most probably stated correctly by Judge Tucker in a work, the merit of which is with pleasure acknowledged. But if a spurious doctrine have been introduced into the common law, and have for centuries been admitted as genuine, it would require great hardihood in a judge to reject it. Accordingly, we find those of the English jurists who seem to disapprove the principle declaring that it is now too firmly setted to be shaken. It is unnecessary to trace this doctrine to its source for another reason: the terms of the constitution comprise no question respecting principal and accessory, so far as either may be truly and in fact said to levy war. Whether in England a person would be indicted in express terms for levying war or for assisting others in levying war, yet if in correct and legal language he can be said to have levied war, and if it have never been decided that the act would not amount to levying war, his case may, without violent construction, be brought within the letter and the plain meaning of the constitution. In examining these words, the argument which may be drawn from felonies, as, for example, from murder, is not more conclusive. Murder is the single act of killing with malice aforethought. But war is a complex operation, composed of many parts, co-operating with each other. No one man or body of men can perform them all if the war be of any continuance. Although, then, in correct and in law language, he alone is said to have murdered another who has perpetrated the fact of killing, or has been present aiding that fact, it does not follow that he alone can have levied war who has borne arms. All those who perform the various and essential military parts of prosecuting the war, which must be assigned to different persons, may with correctness and accuracy be said to levy war. Taking this view of the subject, it appears to the court that those who perform a part in the prosecution of the war may correctly be said to levy war and to commit treason under the constitution. It will be observed that this opinion does not extend to the case of a person who performs no act in the prosecution of the war--who counsels and advises it--or who, being engaged in the conspiracy, fails to perform his part. Whether such persons may be implicated by the doctrine that whatever would make a man an accessory in felony makes him a principal in treason, or are excluded because that doctrine is inapplicable to the United States, the constitution having declared that treason shall consist only in levying war, and having made the proof of overt acts necessary to conviction, is a question of vast importance, which it would be proper for the supreme court to take a fit occasion to decide, but which an inferior tribunal would not willingly determine unless the case before them should require it.
It may now be proper to notice the opinion of the supreme court in the case of the United States against Bollman and Swartwout. It is said that this opinion, in declaring that those who do not bear arms may yet be guilty of treason, is contrary to law, and is not obligatory because it is extra-judicial and was delivered on a point not argued. This court is therefore required to depart from the principle there laid down. It is true that, in that case, after forming the opinion that no treason could be committed because no treasonable assemblage had taken place, the court might have dispensed with proceeding further in the doctrines of treason. But it is to be remembered that the judges might act separately, and perhaps at the same time on the various prosecutions which might be instituted, and that no appeal lay from their decisions. Opposite judgments on the point would have presented a state of things infinitely to be deplored by all. It was not surprising, then, that they should have made some attempt to settle principles which would probably occur, and which were in some degree connected with the point before them. The court had employed some reasoning to show that without the actual embodying of men war could not be levied. It might have been inferred from this that those only who were so embodied could be guilty of treason. Not only to exclude this inference, but also to affirm the contrary, the court proceeded to observe: "It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors." This court is told that if this opinion be incorrect it ought not to be obeyed, because it was extra-judicial. For myself, I can say that I could not lightly be prevailed on to disobey it, were I even convinced that it was erroneous; but I would certainly use any means which the law placed in my power to carry the question again before the supreme court for reconsideration, in a case in which it would directly occur and be fully argued. The court which gave this opinion was composed of four judges. At the time I thought them unanimous, but I have since had reason to suspect that one of them, whose opinion is entitled to great respect, and whose indisposition prevented his entering into the discussions, on some of those points which were not essential to the decision of the very case under consideration, did not concur in this particular point with his brethren. Had the opinion been unanimous, it would have been given by a majority of the judges. But should the three who were absent concur with that judge who was present, and who perhaps dissents from what was then the opinion of the court, a majority of the judges may overrule this decision. I should, therefore, feel no objection, although I then thought and still think the opinion perfectly correct, to carry the point, if possible, again before the supreme court, if the case should depend upon it. In saying that I still think the opinion perfectly correct, I do not consider myself as going further than the preceding reasoning goes. Some gentlemen have argued as if the supreme court had adopted the whole doctrine of the English books on the subject of accessories to treason. But certainly such is not the fact. Those only who perform a part, and who are leagued in the conspiracy, are declared to be traitors. To complete the definition both circumstances must concur. They must "perform a part," which will furnish the overt act; and they must be "leagued in conspiracy." The person who comes within this description in the opinon of the court levies war. The present motion, however, does not rest upon this point; for if under this indictment the United States might be let in to prove the part performed by the prisoner, if he did perform any part, the court could not stop the testimony, in its present stage.
2d. The second point involves the character of the overt act which has been given in evidence, and calls upon the court to declare whether that act can amount to levying war. Although the court ought now to avoid any analysis of the testimony which has been offered in this case, provided the decision of the motion should not rest upon it, yet many reasons concur in giving peculiar propriety to a delivery, in the course of these trials, of a detailed opinion on the question, what is levying war? As this question has been argued at great length, it may probably save much trouble to the counsel now to give that opinon.
In opening the case, it was contended by the attorney for the United States, and has since been maintained on the part of the prosecution, that neither arms nor the application of force or violence are indispensably necessary to constitute the fact of levying war. To illustrate these positions, several cases have been stated, many of which would clearly amount to treason. In all of them, except that which was probably intended to be this case, and on which no observation will be made, the object of the assemblage was clearly treasonable. Its character was unequivocal, and was demonstrated by evidence furnished by the assemblage itself. There was no necessity to rely upon information drawn from extrinsic sources, or, in order to understand the fact, to pursue a course of intricate reasoning, and to conjecture motives. A force is supposed to be collected for an avowed treasonable object, in a condition to attempt that object, and to have commenced the attempt by moving towards it. I state these particulars, because although the cases put may establish the doctrine they are intended to support--may prove that the absence of arms, or the failure to apply force to sensible objects by the actual commission of violence on those objects, may be supplied by other circumstances--yet they also serve to show that the mind requires those circumstances to be satisfied that war is levied. Their construction of the opinion of the supreme court is, I think, thus far correct. It is certainly the opinion which was at the time entertained by myself; and which is still entertained. If a rebel army, avowing its hostility to the sovereign power, should front that of the government, should march and countermarch before it, should manoeuvre in its face, and should then disperse from any cause whatever without firing a gun--I confess I could not, without some surprise, hear gentlemen seriously contend that this could not amount to an act of levying war. A case equally strong may be put with respect to the absence of military weapons. If the party be in a condition to execute the purposed treason without the usual implements of war, I can perceive no reason for requiring those implements in order to constitute the crime.
It is argued that no adjudged case can be produced from the English books where actual violence has not been committed. Suppose this were true. No adjudged case has, or, it is believed, can be produced from those books in which it has been laid down that war cannot be levied without the actual application of violence to external objects. The silence of the reporters on this point may be readily accounted for. In cases of actual rebellion against the government, the most active and influential leaders are generally most actively engaged in the war; and as the object can never be to extend punishment to extermination, a sufficient number are found among those who have committed actual hostilities to satisfy the avenging arm of justice. In cases of constructive treason, such as pulling down meeting-houses, where the direct and avowed object is not the destruction of the sovereign power, some act of violence might be generally required to give to the crime a sufficient degree of malignity to convert it into treason, to render the guilt of any individual unequivocal. But Vaughan's Case is a case where there was no real application of violence, and where the act was adjudged to be treason. Gentlemen argue that Vaughan was only guilty of adhering to the king's enemies, but they have not the authority of the court for so saying. The judges unquestionably treat the cruising of Vaughan as an overt act of levying war. The opinions of the best elementary writers concur in declaring that where a body of men are assembled for the purpose of making war against the government, and are in a condition to make that war, the assemblage is an act of levying war. These opinions are contradicted by no adjudged case, and are supported by Vaughan's Case. This court is not inclined to controvert them. But although, in this respect, the opinion of the supreme court has not been misunderstood on the part of the prosecution, that opinion seems not to have been fully adverted to in a very essential point in which it is said to have been misconceived by others. The opinion, I am informed, has been construed to mean that any assemblage whatever for a treasonable purpose, whether in force or not in force, whether in a condition to use violence or not in that condition, is a levying of war. It is this construction, which has not, indeed, been expressly advanced at the bar, but which is said to have been adopted elsewhere, that the court deems it necessary to examine.
Independent of authority, trusting only to the dictates of reason, and expounding terms according to their ordinary signification, we should probably all concur in the declaration that war could not be levied without the employment and exhibition of force. War is an appeal from reason to the sword; and he who makes the appeal evidences the fact by the use of the means. His intention to go to war may be proved by words; but the actual going to war is a fact which is to be proved by open deed. The end is to be effected by force; and it would seem that in cases where no declaration is to be made, the state of actual war could only be created by the employment of force, or being in a condition to employ it. But the term, having been adopted by our constitution, must be understood in that sense in which it was universally received in this country when the constitution was framed. The sense in which it was received is to be collected from the most approved authorities of that nation from which we have borrowed the term. Lord Coke says that levying war against the king was treason at the common law. "A compassing or conspiracy to levy war, he adds, is no treason, for there must be a levying of war in fact." He proceeds to state cases of constructive levying war, where the direct design is not to overturn the government, but to effect some general object by force. The terms he employs, in stating these cases, are such as indicate an impression on his mind that actual violence is a necessary ingredient in contituting the fact of levying war. He then proceeds to say: "An actual rebellion or insurrection is a levying of war within this fact." "If any with strength and weapons invasive and defensive doth hold and defend a castle or fort against the king and his power, this is levying of war against the king." These cases are put to illustrate what he denominates "a war in fact." It is not easy to conceive "an actual invasion or insurrection" unconnected with force; nor can "a castle or fort be defended with strength and weapons invasive and defensive" without the employment of actual force. It would seem, then, to have been the opinion of Lord Coke that to levy war there must be an assemblage of men in a condition and with an intention to employ force. He certainly puts no case of a different description. Lord Hale says (1 Hale, P. C. p. 149, pl. 6:) "What shall be said a levying of war is partly a question of fact, for it is not every unlawful or riotous assembly of many persons to do an unlawful act, though de facto they commit the act they intend, that makes a levying of war; for then every riot would be treason, &c.," "but it must be such an assembly as carries with it speciem belli, the appearance of war; as if they ride or march vexillis explicatis, with colors flying, or if they be formed into companies or furnished with military officers, or if they are armed with military weapons, as swords, guns, bills, halberds, pikes, and are so circumstanced that it may be reasonably concluded they are in a posture of war; which circumstances are so various that it is hard to describe them all particularly." "Only the general expressions in all the indictments of this nature that I have seen are more guerrino arraiati," arrayed in warlike manner. He afterwards adds: "If there be a war levied as is above declared, viz, an assembly arrayed in warlike manner, and so in the posture of war for any treasonable attempt, it is bellum levatum but not percussum." It is obvious that Lord Hale supposed an assemblage of men in force, in a military posture, to be necessary to constitute the fact of levying war. The idea, he appears to suggest, that the apparatus of war is necessary, has been very justly combated by an able judge who has written a valuable treatise on the subject of treason; but, it is not recollected that his position, that the assembly should be in a posture of war for any treasonable attempt, has ever been denied. Hawkins (chapter 17, § 23), says "that not only those who rebel against the king, and take up arms to dethrone him, but, also, in many other cases, those who, in a violent and forcible manner, withstand his lawful authority, are said to levy war against him, and therefore those that hold a fort or castle against the king's forces, or keep together armed numbers of men, against the king's express command, have been adjudged to levy war against him." The cases put by Hawkins are all cases of actual force and violence. "Those who rebel against the king, and take up arms to dethrone him." In many other cases those "who, in a violent and forcible manner, withstand his lawful authority." "Those that hold a fort or castle against his forces, or keep together armed numbers of men against his express command." These cases are obviously cases of force and violence. Hawkins next proceeds to describe cases in which war is understood to be levied under the statute, although it was not directly made against the government. This Lord Hale terms an interpretative or constructive levying of war; and it will be perceived that he puts no case in which actual force is dispensed with. "Those also, he says, who make an insurrection in order to redress a public grievance, whether it be a real or pretended one, and of their own authority attempt with force to redress it, are said to levy war against the king, although they have no direct design against his person, inasmuch as they insolently invade his prerogative by attempting to do that by private authority which he, by public justice, ought to do; which manifestly tends to a downright rebellion. As where great numbers by force attempt to remove certain persons from the king," &c. The cases here put by Hawkins, of a constructive levying of war, do in terms require force as a constituent part of the description of the offence.
Judge Foster, in his valuable treatise on Treason, states the opinion which has been quoted from Lord Hale, and differs from that writer so far as the latter might seem to require swords, drums, colors, &c., what he terms the pomp and pageantry of war, as essential circumstances to constitute the fact of levying war. In the Cases of Damaree and Purchase, he says: "The want of those circumstances weighed nothing with the court, although the prisoner's counsel insisted much on that matter." But he adds: "The number of the insurgents supplied the want of military weapons; and they were provided with axes, crows, and other tools of the like nature, proper for the mischief they intended to effect. Furor arma ministrat." It is apparent that Judge Foster here alludes to an assemblage in force, or as Lord Hale terms it, "in a warlike posture;" that is, in a condition to attempt or proceed upon the treason which had been contemplated. The same author afterwards states at large the Cases of Damaree and Purchase from 8 State Trials; and they are cases where the insurgents not only assembled in force, in the posture of war, or in a condition to execute the treasonable design, but they did actually carry it into execution, and did resist the guards who were sent to disperse them. Judge Foster states (section 4) all insurrections to effect certain innovations of a public and general concern, by an armed force, to be, in construction of law, high treason within the clause of levying war. The cases put by Foster of constructive levying of war all contain, as a material ingredient, the actual employment of force. After going through this branch of his subject, he proceeds to state the law in a case of actual levying war: that is, where the war is intended directly against the government. He says (section 9): "An assembly armed and arrayed in a warlike manner for a treasonable purpose is bellum levatum, though not bellum percussum. Listing and marching are sufficient overt acts, without coming to a battle or action. So cruising on the king's subjects under a French commission, France being then at war with us, was held to be adhering to the king's enemies, though no other act of hostility be proved." "An assembly armed and arrayed in a warlike manner for any treasonable purpose" is certainly in a state of force: in a condition to execute the treason for which they assembled. The words, "enlisting and marching," which are overt acts of levying war, do, in the arrangement of the sentence, also imply a state of force; though that state is not expressed in terms; for the succeeding words, which state a particular event as not having happened, prove that event to have been the next circumstance to those which had happened; they are "without coming to a battle or action." "If men be enlisted and march," (that is, if they march prepared for battle or in a condition for action; for marching is a technical term applied to the movement of a military corps,) it is an overt act of levying war, though they do not come to a battle or action. This exposition is rendered the stronger by what seems to be put in the same sentence as a parallel case with respect to adhering to an enemy. It is cruising under a commission from an enemy without committing any other act of hostility. Cruising is the act of sailing in warlike form and in a condition to assail those of whom the cruiser is in quest. This exposition, which seems to be that intended by Judge Foster, is rendered the more certain by a reference to the case in the State Trials from which the extracts are taken. The words used by the chief justice are: "When men form themselves into a body and march rank and file with weapons offensive and defensive, this is levying of war with open force, if the design be public." Mr. Phipps, the counsel for the prisoner, afterwards observed: "Intending to levy war is not treason unless a war be actually levied." To this the chief justice answered: "Is it not actually levying of war if they actually provide arms and levy men, and in a warlike manner set out and cruise and come with a design to destroy our ships?" Mr. Phipps still insisted "it would not be an actual levying of war unless they committed some act of hostility." "Yes, indeed," said the chief justice, "the going on board and being in a posture to attack the king's ships." Mr. Baron Powis added: "But for you to say that because they did not actually fight it is not a levying of war! Is it not plain what they did intend? that they came with that intention? that they came in that posture? that they came armed, and had guns and blunderbusses, and surrounded the ship twice? They came with an armed force; that is strong evidence of the design."
The point insisted on by counsel in the Case of Vaughan, as in this case, was, that war could not be levied without actual fighting. In this the counsel was very properly overruled; but it is apparent that the judges proceeded entirely on the idea that a warlike posture was indispensable to the fact of levying war. Judge Foster proceeds to give other instances of levying war: "Attacking the king's forces in opposition to his authority upon a march or in quarters is levying war." "Holding a castle or fort against the king or his forces, if actual force be used in order to keep possession, is levying war. But a bare detainer, as, suppose, by shutting the gates against the king or his forces, without any other force from within, Lord Hale conceiveth will not amount to treason." The whole doctrine of Judge Foster on this subject seems to demonstrate a clear opinion that a state of force or violence, a posture of war, must exist to constitute technically as well as really the fact of levying war.
Judge Blackstone seems to concur with his predecessors. Speaking of levying war, he says: "This may be done by taking arms, not only to dethrone the king, but under pretense to reform religion or the laws, or to remove evil counsellors or other grievances, whether real or pretended. For the law does not, neither can it, permit any private man or set of men to interfere forcibly in matters of such high importance." He proceeds to give examples of levying war, which show that he contemplated actual force as a necessary ingredient in the composition of this crime. It would seem, then, from the English authorities, that the words "levying war" have not received a technical different from their natural meaning, so far as respects the character of the assemblage of men which may constitute the fact. It must be a warlike assemblage, carrying the appearance of force, and in a situation to practice hostility.
Several judges of the United States have given opinions at their circuits on the subject, all of which deserve, and will receive the particular attention of this court.
In his charge to the grand jury, when John Fries was indicted in consequence of a forcible opposition to the direct tax, Judge Iredell is understood to have said: "I think I am warranted in saying that if, in the case of the insurgents who may come under your consideration, the intention was to prevent by force of arms the execution of an act of the congress of the United States altogether, any forcible opposition, calculated to carry that intention into effect, was a levying of war against the United States, and, of course, an act of treason." To levy war, then, according to this opinion of Judge Iredell, required the actual exertion of force. Judge Patterson, in his opinions delivered in two different cases, seems not to differ from Judge Iredell. He does not, indeed, precisely state the employment of force as necessary to constitute a levying war, but in giving his opinion, in cases in which force was actually employed, he considers the crime in one case as dependent on the intention; and in the other case he says: "Combining these facts and this design," (that is, combining actual force with a treasonable design,) "the crime is high treason." Judge Peters has also indicated the opinion that force was necessary to constitute the crime of levying war. Judge Chase has been particularly clear and explicit. In an opinion which he appears to have prepared on great consideration, he says: "The court are of opinion that if a body of people conspire and meditate an insurrection to resist or oppose the execution of a statute of the United States by force, they are only guilty of a high misdemeanor; but if they proceed to carry such intention into execution by force, that they are guilty of the treason of levying war; and the quantum of the force employed neither increases nor diminishes the crime; whether by one hundred or one thousand persons is wholly immaterial. The court are of opinion that a combination or conspiracy to levy war against the United States is not treason unless combined with an attempt to carry such combination or conspiracy into execution; some actual force or violence must be used in pursuance of such design to levy war; but that it is altogether immaterial whether the force used be sufficient to effectuate the object. Any force connected with the intention will constitute the crime of levying of war." In various parts of the opinion delivered by Judge Chase, in the case of Fries, the same sentiments are to be found. It is to be observed that these judges are not content that troops should be assembled in a condition to employ force. According to them some degree of force must have been actually employed. The judges of the United States, then, so far as their opinions have been quoted, seem to have required still more to constitute the fact of levying war than has been required by the English books. Our judges seem to have required the actual exercise of force, the actual employment of some degree of violence. This, however, may be, and probably is, because, in the cases in which their opinions were given, the design not having been to overturn the government, but to resist the execution of a law, such an assemblage as would be sufficient for the purpose would require the actual employment of force to render the object unequivocal.
But it is said all these authorities have been overruled by the decision of the supreme court in the case of U. S. v. Swartwout [4 Cranch (8 U. S.) 75]. If the supreme court have indeed extended the doctrine of treason further than it has heretofore been carried by the judges of England or of this country, their decision would be submitted to. At least this court could go no further than to endeavor again to bring the point directly before them. It would, however, be expected that an opinion which is to overrule all former precedents, and to establish a principle never before recognized, should be expressed in plain and explicit terms. A mere implication ought not to prostrate a principle which seems to have been so well established. Had the intention been entertained to make so material a change in this respect, the court ought to have expressly declared that any assemblage of men whatever, who had formed a treasonable design, whether in force or not, whether in a condition to attempt the design or not, whether attended with warlike appearances or not, constitutes the fact of levying war. Yet no declaration to this amount is made. Not an expression of the kind is to be found in the opinion of the supreme court. The foundation on which this argument rests is the omission of the court to state that the assemblage which constitutes the fact of levying war ought to be in force, and some passages which show that the question respecting the nature of the assemblage was not in the mind of the court when the opinion was drawn; which passages are mingled with others which at least show that there was no intention to depart from the course of the precedents in cases of treason by levying war. Every opinion, to be correctly understood, ought to be considered with a view to the case in which it was delivered. In the case of the United States against Bollman and Swartwout, there was no evidence that even two men had ever met for the purpose of executing the plan in which those persons were charged with having participated. It was, therefore, sufficient for the court to say that unless men were assembled, war could not be levied. That case was decided by this declaration. The court might indeed have defined the species of assemblage which would amount to levying of war; but, as this opinion was not a treatise on treason, but a decision of a particular case, expressions of doubtful import should be construed in reference to the case itself, and the mere omission to state that a particular circumstance was necessary to the consummation of the crime ought not to be construed into a declaration that the circumstance was unimportant. General expressions ought not to be considered as overruling settled principles, without a direct declaration to that effect. After these preliminary observations, the court will proceed to examine the opinion which has occasioned them.
The first expression in it bearing on the present question is, "To constitute that specific crime for which the prisoner now before the court has been committed, war must be actually levied against the United States. However flagitious may be the crime of conspiracy to subvert by force the government of our country, such conspiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war and actually to levy war are distinct offences. The first must be brought into operation by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself, or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed." Although it is not expressly stated that the assemblage of men for the purpose of carrying into operation the treasonable intent which will amount to levying war must be an assemblage in force, yet it is fairly to be inferred from the context; and nothing like dispensing with force appears in this paragraph. The expressions are, "to constitute the crime, war must be actually levied." A conspiracy to levy war is spoken of as "a conspiracy to subvert by force the government of our country." Speaking in general terms of an assemblage of men for this or for any other purpose, a person would naturally be understood as speaking of an assemblage in some degree adapted to the purpose. An assemblage to subvert by force the government of our country, and amounting to a levying of war, should be an assemblage in force. In a subsequent paragraph the court says: "It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of this crime who has not appeared in arms against his country. On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled in order to effect by force a treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however minute, &c., and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are traitors. But there must be an actual assembling of men for the treasonable purpose to constitute a levying of war." The observations made on the preceding paragraph apply to this. "A body of men actually assembled, in order to effect by force a treasonable purpose," must be a body assembled with such appearance of force as would warrant the opinion that they were assembled for the particular purpose. An assemblage to constitute an actual levying of war should be an assemblage with such appearance of force as would justify the opinion that they met for the purpose. This explanation, which is believed to be the natural, certainly not a strained explanation of the words, derives some additional aid from the terms in which the paragraph last quoted commences: "It is not the intention of the court to say that no individual can be guilty of treason who has not appeared in arms against his country." These words seem intended to obviate an inference which might otherwise have been drawn from the preceding paragraph. They indicate that in the mind of the court the assemblage stated in that paragraph was an assemblage in arms; that the individuals who composed it had appeared in arms against their country; that is, in other words, that the assemblage was a military, a warlike assemblage. The succeeding paragraph in the opinion relates to a conspiracy, and serves to show that force and violence were in the mind of the court, and that there was no idea of extending the crime of treason by construction beyond the constitutional definition which had been given of it.
Returning to the case actually before the court, it is said: "A design to overturn the government of the United States in New Orleans by force would have been unquestionably a design which if carried into execution would have been treason; and the assemblage of a body of men for the purpose of carrying it into execution would amount to levying of war against the United States." Now what could reasonably be said to be an assemblage of a body of men for the purpose of overturning the government of the United States in New Orleans by force? Certainly an assemblage in force; an assemblage prepared, and intending to act with force; a military assemblage. The decisions theretofore made by the judges of the United States are, then, declared to be in conformity with the principles laid down by the supreme court. Is this declaration compatible with the idea of departing from those opinions on a point within the contemplation of the court? The opinions of Judge Patterson and Judge Iredell are said "to imply an actual assembling of men, though they rather designed to remark on the purpose to which the force was to be applied than on the nature of the force itself." This observation certainly indicates that the necessity of an assemblage of men was the particular point the court meant to establish, and that the idea of force was never separated from this assemblage.
The opinion of Judge Chase is next quoted with approbation. This opinion in terms requires the employment of force. After stating the verbal communication said to have been made by Mr. Swartwout to General Wilkinson, the court says, "If these words import that the government of New Orleans was to be revolutionized by force, although merely as a step to, or a means of executing some greater projects, the design was unquestionably treasonable; and any assemblage of men for that purpose would amount to a levying of war." The words "any assemblage of men," if construed to affirm that any two or three of the conspirators who might be found together after this plan had been formed would be the act of levying war, would certainly be misconstrued. The sense of the expression, "any assemblage of men," is restricted by the words "for this purpose." Now, could it be in the contemplation of the court that a body of men would assemble for the purpose of revolutionizing New Orleans by force, who should not themselves be in force? After noticing some difference of opinion among the judges respecting the import of the words said to have been used by Mr. Swartwout, the court proceeds to observe: "But whether this treasonable intention be really imputable to the plan or not, it is admitted that it must have been carried into execution by an open assemblage for that purpose, previous to the arrest of the prisoner, in order to consummate the crime as to him." Could the court have conceived "an open assemblage" "for the purpose of overturning the government of New Orleans by force," to be only equivalent to a secret, furtive assemblage without the appearance of force? After quoting the words of Mr. Swartwout, from the affidavit, in which it was stated that Mr. Burr was levying an army of 7,000 men, and observing that the treason to be inferred from these words would depend on the intention with which it was levied, and on the progress which had been made in levying it, the court says: "The question, then, is whether this evidence prove Colonel Burr to have advanced so far in levying an army as actually to have assembled them." Actually to assemble an army of 7,000 men is unquestionably to place those who are so assembled in a state of open force. But as the mode of expression used in this passage might be misconstrued so far as to countenance the opinion that it would be necessary to assemble the whole army in order to constitute the fact of levying war, the court proceeds to say: "It is argued that since it cannot be necessary that the whole 7,000 men should be assembled, their commencing their march by detachments to the place of rendezvous must be sufficient to constitute the crime. This position is correct with some qualification. It cannot be necessary that the whole army should assemble, and that the various parts which are to compose it should have combined. But it is necessary there should be an actual assemblage; and therefore this evidence should make the fact unequivocal. The travelling of individuals to the place of rendezvous would, perhaps, not be sufficient. This would be an equivocal act, and has no warlike appearance. The meeting of particular bodies of men, and their march from places of partial to a place of general rendezvous, would be such an assemblage." The position here stated by the counsel for the prosecution is that the army "commencing its march by detachments to the place of rendezvous (that is, of the army) must be sufficient to constitute the crime." This position is not admitted by the court to be universally correct. It is said to be "correct with some qualification." What is that qualification? "The travelling of individuals to the place of rendezvous (and by this term is not to be understood one individual by himself, but several individuals, either separately or together, but not in military form) would perhaps not be sufficient." Why not sufficient? Because, says the court, "this would be an equivocal act and has no warlike appearance." The act, then, should be unequivocal and should have a warlike appearance. It must exhibit, in the words of Sir Matthew Hale, speciem belli, the appearance of war. This construction is rendered in some measure necessary when we observe that the court is qualifying the position, "that the army commencing their march by detachments to the place of rendezvous must be sufficient to constitute the crime." In qualifying this position they say, "the travelling of individuals would perhaps not be sufficient." Now, a solitary individual travelling to any point, with any intent, could not, without a total disregard of language, be termed a marching detachment. The court, therefore, must have contemplated several individuals travelling together, and the words being used in reference to the position they intended to qualify, would seem to indicate the distinction between the appearances attending the usual movement of a company of men for civil purposes, and that military movement which might, in correct language, be denominated "marching by detachments." The court then proceeded to say: "The meeting of particular bodies of men, and their marching from places of partial to a place of general rendezvous, would be such an assemblage."
It is obvious from the context that the court must have intended to state a case which would in itself be unequivocal, because it would have a warlike appearance. The case stated is that of distinct bodies of men assembling at different places, and marching from these places of partial to a place of general rendezvous. When this has been done an assemblage is produced which would in itself be unequivocal. But when is it done? What is the assemblage here described? The assemblage formed of the different bodies of partial at a place of general rendezvous. In describing the mode of coming to this assemblage the civil term "travelling" is dropped, and the military term "marching" is employed. If this were intended as a definition of an assemblage which would amount to levying war, the definition requires an assemblage at a place of general rendezvous, composed of bodies of men who had previously assembled at places of partial rendezvous. But this is not intended as a definition; for clearly if there should be no places of partial rendezvous, if troops should embody in the first instance in great force for the purpose of subverting the government by violence, the act would be unequivocal; it would have a warlike appearance; and it would, according to the opinion of the supreme court, properly construed, and according to English authorities, amount to levying war. But this, though not a definition, is put as an example, and surely it may be safely taken as an example. If different bodies of men, in pursuance of a treasonable design, plainly proved, should assemble in warlike appearance at places of partial rendezvous, and should march from those places to a place of general rendezvous, it is difficult to conceive how such a transaction could take place without exhibiting the appearance of war, without an obvious display of force. At any rate, a court in stating generally such a military assemblage as would amount to levying war, and having a case before it in which there was no assemblage whatever, cannot reasonably be understood, in putting such an example, to dispense with those appearances of war which seem to be required by the general current of authorities. Certainly it ought not to be so understood when it says in express terms that "it is more safe as well as more consonant to the principles of our constitution that the crime of treason should not be extended by construction to doubtful cases; and that crimes not clearly within the constitutional definition should receive such punishment as the legislature in its wisdom may provide."
After this analysis of the opinion of the supreme court, it will be observed that the direct question, whether an assemblage of men which might be construed to amount to a levying of war must appear in force or in military form, was not in argument or in fact before the court, and does not appear to have been in terms decided. The opinion seems to have been drawn without particularly adverting to this question; and, therefore, upon a transient view of particular expressions, might inspire the idea that a display of force, that appearances of war, were not necessary ingredients to constitute the fact of levying war. But upon a more intent and more accurate investigation of this opinion, although the terms force and violence are not employed as descriptive of the assemblage, such requisites are declared to be indispensable as can scarcely exist without the appearance of war and the existence of real force. It is said that war must be levied in fact; that the object must be one which is to be effected by force; that the assemblage must be such as to prove that this is its object; that it must not be an equivocal act, without a warlike appearance; that it must be an open assemblage for the purpose of force. In the course of this opinion, decisions are quoted and approved which require the employment of force to constitute the crime. It seems extremely difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile these various declarations with the idea that the supreme court considered a secret, unarmed meeting, although that meeting be of conspirators, and although it met with a treasonable intent, as an actual levying of war. Without saying that the assemblage must be in force or in warlike form, it expresses itself so as to show that this idea was never discarded; and it uses terms which cannot be otherwise satisfied. The opinion of a single judge certainly weighs as nothing if opposed to that of the supreme court; but if he were one of the judges who assisted in framing that opinion, if while the impression under which it was framed was yet fresh upon his mind he delivered an opinion on the same testimony, not contradictory to that which had been given by all the judges together, but showing the sense in which he understood terms that might be differently expounded, it may fairly be said to be in some measure explanatory of the opinion itself. To the judge before whom the charge against the prisoner at the bar was first brought the same testimony was offered with that which had been exhibited before the supreme court; and he was required to give an opinion in almost the same case. Upon this occasion he said "war can only be levied by the employment of actual force. Troops must be embodied, men must be assembled, in order to levy war." Again he observed: "The fact to be proved in this case is an act of public notoriety. It must exist in the view of the world, or it cannot exist at all. The assembling of forces to levy war is a visible transaction; and numbers must witness it." It is not easy to doubt what kind of assemblage was in the mind of the judge who used these expressions; and it is to be recollected that he had just returned from the supreme court, and was speaking on the very facts on which the opinion of that court was delivered. The same judge, in his charge to the grand jury who found this bill, observed: "To constitute the fact of levying war it is not necessary that hostilities shall have actually commenced by engaging the military force of the United States, or that measures of violence against the government shall have been carried into execution. But levying war is a fact, in the constitution of which force is an indispensable ingredient. Any combination to subvert by force the government of the United States, violently to dismember the Union, to compel a change in the administration, to coerce the repeal or adoption of a general law, is a conspiracy to levy war; and if the conspiracy be carried into effect by the actual employment of force, by the embodying and assembling of men for the purpose of executing the treasonable design which was previously conceived, it amounts to levying of war. It has been held that arms are not essential to levying war, provided the force assembled be sufficient to attain, or, perhaps, to justify attempting the object without them." This paragraph is immediately followed by a reference to the opinion of the supreme court.
It requires no commentary upon these words to show that, in the opinion of the judge who uttered them, an assemblage of men which should constitute the fact of levying war must be an assemblage in force, and that he so understood the opinion of the supreme court. If in that opinion there may be found in some passages a want of precision, and an indefiniteness of expression, which has occasioned it to be differently understood by different persons, that may well be accounted for when it is recollected that in the particular case there was no assemblage whatever. In expounding that opinion the whole should be taken together, and in reference to the particular case in which it was delivered. It is, however, not improbable that the misunderstanding has arisen from this circumstance: The court unquestionably did not consider arms as an indispensable requisite to levying war. An assemblage adapted to the object might be in a condition to effect or to attempt it without them. Nor did the court consider the actual application of the force to the object as at all times an indispensable requisite; for an assemblage might be in a condition to apply force, might be in a state adapted to real war, without having made the actual application of that force. From these positions, which are to be found in the opinion, it may have been inferred, it is thought too hastily, that the nature of the assemblage was unimportant, and that war might be considered as actually levied by any meeting of men, if a criminal intention can be imputed to them by testimony of any kind whatever.
It has been thought proper to discuss this question at large, and to review the opinion of the supreme court, although this court would be more disposed to leave the question of fact, whether an overt act of levying war were committed on Blennerhassett's Island to the jury, under this explanation of the law, and to instruct them that unless the assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island was an assemblage in force, was a military assemblage in a condition to make war, it was not a levying of war, and that they could not construe it into an act of war, than to arrest the further testimony which might be offered to connect the prisoner with that assemblage, or to prove the intention of those who assembled together at that place. This point, however, is not to be understood as decided. It will, perhaps, constitute an essential inquiry in another case.
Before leaving the opinion of the supreme court entirely, on the question of the nature of the assemblage which will constitute an act of levying war, this court cannot forbear to ask, why is an assemblage absolutely required? Is it not to judge in some measure of the end by the proportion which the means bear to the end? Why is it that a single armed individual entering a boat, and sailing down the Ohio for the avowed purpose of attacking New Orleans, could not be said to levy war? Is it not that he is apparently not in a condition to levy war? If this be so, ought not the assemblage to furnish some evidence of its intention and capacity to levy war before it can amount to levying war? And ought not the supreme court, when speaking of an assemblage for the purpose of effecting a treasonable object by force, be understood to indicate an assemblage exhibiting the appearance of force? The definition of the attorney for the United States deserves notice in this respect. It is, "When there is an assemblage of men, convened for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object, which force is meant to be employed before the assemblage disperses, this is treason." To read this definition without adverting to the argument, we should infer that the assemblage was itself to effect by force the treasonable object, not to join itself to some other bodies of men and then to effect the object by their combined force. Under this construction, it would be expected the appearance of the assemblage would bear some proportion to the object, and would indicate the intention; at any rate, that it would be an assemblage in force. This construction is most certainly not that which was intended; but it serves to show that general phrases must always be understood in reference to the subject-matter and to the general principles of law.
On that division of the subject which respects the merits of the case connected with the pleadings, two points are also made: 1st. That this indictment, having charged the prisoner with levying war on Blennerhassett's Island, and containing no other overt act, cannot be supported by proof that war was levied at that place by other persons in the absence of the prisoner, even admitting those persons to be connected with him in one common treasonable conspiracy. 2dly. That admitting such an indictment could be supported by such evidence, the previous conviction of some person, who committed the act which is said to amount to levying war, is indispensable to the conviction of a person who advised or procured that act.
As to the first point, the indictment contains two counts, one of which charges that the prisoner, with a number of persons unknown, levied war on Blennerhassett's Island, in the county of Wood, in the district of Virginia; and the other adds the circumstance of their proceeding from that island down the river for the purpose of seizing New Orleans by force. In point of fact, the prisoner was not on Blennerhassett's Island, nor in the county of Wood, nor in the district of Virginia. In considering this point, the court is led first to inquire whether an indictment for levying war must specify an overt act, or would be sufficient if it merely charged the prisoner in general terms with having levied war, omitting the expression of place or circumstance. The place in which a crime was committed is essential to an indictment, were it only to show the jurisdiction of the court. It is, also, essential for the purpose of enabling the prisoner to make his defence. That at common law an indictment would have been defective which did not mention the place in which the crime was committed can scarcely be doubted. For this, it is sufficient to refer to Hawk. P. C. bk. 2, c. 25, § 84, and Id. chapter 23, § 91. This necessity is rendered the stronger by the constitutional provision that the offender "shall be tried in the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed," and by the act of congress which requires that twelve petit jurors at least shall be summoned from the county where the offence was committed. A description of the particular manner in which the war was levied seems, also, essential to enable the accused to make his defence. The law does not expect a man to be prepared to defend every act of his life which may be suddenly and without notice alleged against him. In common justice, the particular fact with which he is charged ought to be stated, and stated in such a manner as to afford a reasonable certainty of the nature of the accusation and the circumstances which will be adduced against him. The general doctrine on the subject of indictments is full to this point. Foster (Crown Law, p. 194), speaking of the treason of compassing the king's death, says: "From what has been said, it followeth that in every indictment for this species of treason, and, indeed, for levying war and adhering to the king's enemies, an overt act must be alleged and proved. For the overt act is the charge to which the prisoner must apply his defence." In page 220 Foster repeats this declaration. It is, also, laid down in Hawk. P. C. bk. 8, c. 17, § 29; 1 Hale, P. C. 121; 1 East, P. C. 116, and by the other authorities cited, especially Vaughan's Case. In corroboration of this opinion, it may be observed that treason can only be established by the proof of overt acts, and that by the common law as well as by the statute of 7 Wm. III. those overt acts only which are charged in the indictment can be given in evidence, unless, perhaps, as corroborative testimony after the overt acts are proved. That clause in the constitution, too, which says that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right "To be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation," is considered as having a direct bearing on this point. It secures to him such information as will enable him to prepare for his defence. It seems, then, to be perfectly clear that it would not be sufficient for an indictment to allege generally that the accused had levied war against the United States. The charge must be more particularly specified by laying what is termed an overt act of levying war. The law relative to an appeal as cited from Stamford, is strongly corroborative of this opinion.
If it be necessary to specify the charge in the indictment, it would seem to follow, irresistibly, that the charge must be proved as laid. All the authorities which require an overt act, require also that this overt act should be proved. The decision in Vaughan's Case is particularly in point. Might it be otherwise, the charge of an overt act would be a mischief instead of an advantage to the accused. It would lead him from the true cause and nature of the accusation, instead of informing him respecting it. But it is contended on the part of the prosecution that, although the accused had never been with the party which assembled at Blennerhassett's Island, and was, at that time, at a great distance, and in a different state, he was yet legally present, and, therefore, may properly be charged in the indictment as being present in fact. It is, therefore, necessary to inquire whether in this case the doctrine of constructive presence can apply. It is conceived by the court to be possible that a person may be concerned in a treasonable conspiracy, and yet be legally as well as actually absent while some one act of the treason is perpetrated. If a rebellion should be so extensive as to spread through every state in the Union, it will scarcely be contended that every individual concerned in it is legally present at every overt act committed in the course of that rebellion. It would be a very violent presumption indeed, too violent to be made without clear authority, to presume that even the chief of the rebel army was legally present at every such overt act. If the main rebel army, with the chief at its head, should be prosecuting war at one extremity of our territory, say in New Hampshire; if this chief should be there captured and sent to the other extremity for the purpose of trial; if his indictment, instead of alleging an overt act which was true in point of fact, should allege that he had assembled some small party which in truth he had not seen, and had levied war by engaging in a skirmish in Georgia at a time when, in reality, he was fighting a battle in New Hampshire; if such evidence would support such an indictment by the fiction that he was legally present, though really absent, all would ask to what purpose are those provisions in the constitution, which direct the place of trial and ordain that the accused shall be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation? But that a man may be legally absent who has counselled or procured a treasonable act is proved by all those books which treat upon the subject, and which concur in declaring that such a person is a principal traitor, not because he was legally present, but because in treason all are principals. Yet the indictment, speaking upon general principles, would charge him according to the truth of the case. Lord Coke says: "If many conspire to levy war, and some of them do levy the same according to the conspiracy, this is high treason in all." Why? because all were legally present when the war was levied? No. "For in treason," continues Lord Coke, "all be principals, and war is levied." In this case the indictment, reasoning from analogy, would not charge that the absent conspirators were present, but would state the truth of the case. If the conspirator had done nothing which amounted to levying of war, and if by our constitution the doctrine that an accessory becomes a principal be not adopted, in consequence of which the conspirator could not be condemned under an indictment stating the truth of the case, it would be going very far to say that this defect, if it be termed one, may be cured by an indictment stating the case untruly.
This doctrine of Lord Coke has been adopted by all subsequent writers, and it is generally laid down in the English books that whatever will make a man an accessory in felony, will make him a principal in treason; but it is nowhere suggested that he is by construction to be considered as present when in point of fact he was absent. Foster has been particularly quoted, and certainly he is precisely in point. "It is well known," says Foster, "that in the language of the law there are no accessories in high treason; all are principals. Every instance of incitement, aid, or protection, which in the case of felony will render a man an accessory before or after the fact, in the case of high treason, whether it be treason at common law or by statute, will make him a principal in treason." The cases of incitement and aid are cases put as examples of a man's becoming a principal in treason, not because he was legally present, but by force of that maxim in the common law, that whatever will render a man an accessory at common law will render him a principal in treason. In other passages the words "command" or "procure" are used to indicate the same state of things; that is, a treasonable assemblage produced by a man who is not himself in that assemblage. In point of law, then, the man who incites, aids, or procures a treasonable act, is not, merely in consequence of that incitement, aid, or procurement, legally present when that act is committed. If it do not result, from the nature of the crime, that all who are concerned in it are legally present at every overt act, then each case depends upon its own circumstances; and to judge how far the circumstances of any case can make him legally present, who is in fact absent, the doctrine of constructive presence must be examined.
Hale in volume 1, p. 615, says: "Regularly no man can be a principal in felony unless he be present." In the same page he says: "An accessory before is he that, being absent at the time of the felony committed, doth yet procure, counsel, or command another to commit a felony." The books are full of passages which state this to be the law. Foster, in showing what acts of concurrence will make a man a principal, says: "He must be present at the perpetration, otherwise he can be no more than an accessory before the fact." These strong distinctions would be idle, at any rate they would be inapplicable to treason, if they were to be entirely lost in the doctrine of constructive presence. Foster adds (page 349): "When the law requireth the presence of the accomplice at the perpetration of the fact in order to render him a principal, it doth not require a strict actual immediate presence, such a presence as would make him an eye or ear witness of what passeth." The terms used by Foster are such as would be employed by a man intending to show the necessity that the absent person should be near at hand, although from the nature of the thing no precise distance could be marked out. An inspection of the cases from which Foster drew this general principle will serve to illustrate it. Hale, P. C. p. 439. In all these cases, put by Hale, the whole party set out together to commit the very fact charged in the indictment; or to commit some other unlawful act, in which they are all to be personally concerned at the same time and place, and are, at the very time when the criminal fact is committed, near enough to give actual personal aid and assistance to the man who perpetrated it. Hale, in page 449, giving the reason for the decision in the case of the Lord Dacre, says: "They all came with an intent to steal the deer; and consequently the law supposes that they came all with the intent to oppose all that should hinder them in that design." The original case says this was their resolution. This opposition would be a personal opposition. This case, even as stated by Hale, would clearly not comprehend any man who entered into the combination, but who, instead of going to the park where the murder was committed, should not set out with the others, should go to a different park, or should even lose his way. In both these cases stated in Hale, P. C. p. 534, the persons actually set out together, and were near enough to assist in the commission of the fact. That in the Case of Pudsey the felony was, as stated by Hale, a different felony from that originally intended, is unimportant in regard to the particular principle now under consideration; so far as respected distance, as respected capacity to assist in case of resistance, it is the same as if the robbery had been that which was originally designed. The case in the original report shows that the felony committed was in fact in pursuance of that originally designed. Foster (page 350) plainly supposes the same particular design, not a general design composed of many particular distinct facts. He supposes them to be co-operating with respect to that particular design. This may be illustrated by a case which is, perhaps, common. Suppose a band of robbers confederated for the general purpose of robbing. They set out together, or in parties, to rob a particular individual; and each performs the part assigned to him. Some ride up to the individual, and demand his purse. Others watch out of sight to intercept those who might be coming to assist the man on whom the robbery is to be committed. If murder or robbery actually take place, all are principals; and all in construction of law are present. But suppose they set out at the same time or at different times, by different roads, to attack and rob different individuals or different companies; to commit distinct acts of robbery. It has never been contended that those who committed one act of robbery, or who failed altogether, were constructively present at the act of those who were associated with them in the common object of robbery, who were to share the plunder, but who did not assist at the particular fact. They do, indeed, belong to the general party; but they are not of the particular party which committed this fact. Foster concludes this subject by observing that "in order to render a person an accomplice and a principal in felony, he must be aiding and abetting at the fact, or ready to afford assistance if necessary:" that is, at the particular fact which is charged. He must be ready to render assistance to those who are committing that fact. He must, as is stated by Hawkins, be ready to give immediate and direct assistance. All the cases to be found in the books go to the same point. Let them be applied to that under consideration.
The whole treason laid in this indictment is the levying of war in Blennerhassett's island; and the whole question to which the inquiry of the court is now directed is whether the prisoner was legally present at that fact. I say this is the whole question; because the prisoner can only be convicted on the overt act laid in the indictment. With respect to this prosecution, it is as if no other overt act existed. If other overt acts can be inquired into, it is for the sole purpose of proving the particular fact charged. It is an evidence of the crime consisting of this particular fact, not as establishing the general crime by a distinct fact. The counsel for the prosecution have charged those engaged in the defence with considering the overt act as treason, whereas it ought to be considered solely as the evidence of the treason; but the counsel for the prosecution seem themselves not to have sufficiently adverted to this clear principle; that though the overt act may not be itself the treason, it is the sole act of that treason which can produce conviction. It is the sole point in issue between the parties. And the only division of that point, if the expression be allowed, which the court is now examining, is the constructive presence of the prisoner at the fact charged.
To return then, to the application of the cases. Had the prisoner set out with the party from Beaver for Blennerhassett's Island, or perhaps had he set out for that place, though not from Beaver, and had arrived in the island, he would have been present at the fact. Had he not arrived in the island, but had taken a position near enough to cooperate with those on the island, to assist them in any act of hostility, or to aid them if attacked, the question whether he was constructively present would be a question compounded of law and fact, which would be decided by the jury, with the aid of the court, so far as respected the law. In this case the accused would have been of the particular party assembled on the island, and would have been associated with them in the particular act of levying war said to have been committed on the island. But if he was not with the party at any time before they reached the island; if he did not join them there, or intend to join them there; if his personal co-operation in the general plan was to be afforded elsewhere, at a great distance, in a different state; if the overt acts of treason to be performed by him were to be distinct overt acts--then he was not of the particular party assembled at Blennerhassett's Island, and was not constructively present, aiding and assisting in the particular act which was there committed. The testimony on this point, so far as it has been delivered, is not equivocal. There is not only no evidence that the accused was of the particular party which assembled on Blennerhassett's Island, but the whole evidence shows he was not of that party. In felony, then, admitting the crime to have been completed on the island, and to have been advised, procured, or commanded by the accused, he would have been incontestably an accessory and not a principal. But in treason, it is said, the law is otherwise, because the theatre of action is more extensive. The reasoning applies in England as strongly as in the United States. While in '15 and '45 the family of Stuart sought to regain the crown they had forfeited, the struggle was for the whole kingdom, yet no man was ever considered as legally present at one place, when actually at another; or as aiding in one transaction while actually employed in another. With the perfect knowledge that the whole nation may be the theatre of action, the English books unite in declaring that he who counsels, procures, or aids treason, is guilty accessorially, and solely in virtue of the common law principle that what will make a man an accessory in felony makes him a principal in treason. So far from considering a man as constructively present at every overt act of the general treason in which he may have been concerned, the whole doctrine of the books limits the proof against him to those particular overt acts of levying war with which he is charged. What would be the effect of a different doctrine? Clearly that which has been stated. If a person levying war in Kentucky may be said to be constructively present and assembled with a party carrying on war in Virginia at a great distance from him, then he is present at every overt act performed anywhere. He may be tried in any state on the continent, where any overt act has been committed. He may be proved to be guilty of an overt act laid in the indictment in which he had no personal participation, by proving that he advised it, or that he committed other acts. This is, perhaps, too extravagant to be in terms maintained. Certainly it cannot be supported by the doctrines of the English law.
The opinion of Judge Patterson in Mitchell's Case has been cited on this point, 2 Dall. [2 U. S.] 348. The indictment is not specially stated, but from the case as reported, it must have been either general for levying war in the county of Allegany, and the overt act must have been the assemblage of men and levying of war in that county, or it must have given a particular detail of the treasonable transactions in that county. The first supposition is the most probable, but let the indictment be in the one form or the other, and the result is the same. The facts of the case are that a large body of men, of whom Mitchell was one, assembled at Braddock's field, in the county of Allegany, for the purpose of committing acts of violence at Pittsburg; that there was also an assemblage at a different time at Couch's fort, at which the prisoner also attended. The general and avowed object of that meeting was to concert measures for resisting the execution of a public law. At Couch's fort the resolution was taken to attack the house of the inspector, and the body there assembled marched to that house and attacked it. It was proved by the competent number of witnesses that he was at Couch's fort armed; that he offered to reconnoitre the house to be attacked; that he marched with the insurgents towards the house; that he was with them after the action attending the body of one of his comrades who was killed in it. One witness swore positively that he was present at the burning of the house; and a second witness swore positively that he was present at the burning of the house; and a second witness said that "it run in his head that he had seen him there." That a doubt should exist in such a case as this is strong evidence of the necessity that the overt act should be unequivocally proved by two witnesses.
But what was the opinion of the judge in this case? Couch's fort and Neville's house being in the same county, the assemblage having been at Couch's fort, and the resolution to attack the house having been there taken, the body having for the avowed purpose moved in execution of that resolution towards the house to be attacked, he inclined to think that the act of marching was in itself levying war. If it was, then the overt act laid in the indictment was consummated by the assemblage at Couch's and the marching from thence; and Mitchell was proved to be guilty by more than two positive witnesses. But without deciding this to be the law, he proceeded to consider the meeting at Couch's, the immediate marching to Neville's house, and the attack and burning of the house, as one transaction. Mitchell was proved by more than two positive witnesses to have been in that transaction, to have taken an active part in it; and the judge declared it to be unnecessary that all should have been him at the same time and place. But suppose not a single witness had proved Mitchell to have been at Couch's, or on the march, or at Neville's. Suppose he had been at the time notoriously absent in a different state. Can it be believed by any person who observes the caution with which Judge Patterson required the constitutional proof of two witnesses to the same overt act, that he would have said Mitchell was constructively present, and might, on that straining of a legal fiction, be found guilty of treason? Had he delivered such an opinion, what would have been the language of this country respecting it? Had he given this opinion, it would have required all the correctness of his life to strike his name from that bloody list in which the name of Jeffreys is enrolled.
But to estimate the opinion in Mitchell's Case, let its circumstances be transferred to Burr's Case. Suppose the body of men assembled in Blennerhassett's Island had previously met at some other place in the same county; that Burr had been proved to be with them by four witnesses; that the resolution to march to Blennerhassett's Island for a treasonable purpose had been there taken; that he had been seen on the march with them: that one witness had seen him on the island; that another thought he had seen him there; that he had been seen with the party directly after leaving the island; that this indictment had charged the levying of war in Wood county generally--the cases would, then, have been precisely parallel; and the decision would have been the same. In conformity with principle and with authority, then, the prisoner at the bar was neither legally nor actually present at Blennerhassett's Island; and the court is strongly inclined to the opinion that without proving an actual or legal presence by two witnesses, the overt act laid in this indictment cannot be proved.
But this opinion is controverted on two grounds: The first is, that the indictment does not charge the prisoner to have been present. The second, that although he was absent, yet if he caused the assemblage, he may be indicted as being present, and convicted on evidence that he caused the treasonable act. The first position is to be decided by the indictment itself. The court understands the allegation differently from the attorney for the United States. The court understands it to be directly charged that the prisoner did assemble with the multitude, and did march with them. Nothing will more clearly test this construction than putting the case into a shape which it may possibly take. Suppose the law be that the indictment would be defective unless it alleged the presence of the person indicted at the act of treason. If, upon a special verdict, facts should be found which amounted to a levying of war by the accused, and his counsel should insist that he could not be condemned because the indictment was defective in not charging that he was himself one of the assemblage which constituted the treason, or because it alleged the procurement defectively, would the attorney admit this construction of his indictment to be correct? I am persuaded he would not, and that he ought not to make such a concession. If, after a verdict, the indictment ought to be construed to allege that the prisoner was one of the assemblage at Blennerhassett's Island, it ought to be so construed now. But this is unimportant; for if the indictment alleges that the prisoner procured the assemblage, that procurement becomes part of the overt act, and must be proved, as will be shown hereafter. The second position is founded on 1 Hale, P. C. 214, 288, and 1 East P. C. 127.
While I declare that this doctrine contradicts every idea I had ever entertained on the subject of indictments, (since it admits that one case may be stated, and a very different case may be proved,) I will acknowledge that it is countenanced by the authorities adduced in its support. To counsel or advise a treasonable assemblage, and to be one of that assemblage, are certainly distinct acts, and, therefore, ought not to be charged as the same act. The great objection to this mode of proceeding is, that the proof essentially varies from the charge in the character and essence of the offence, and in the testimony by which the accused is to defend himself. These dicta of Lord Hale, therefore, taken in the extent in which they are understood by the counsel for the United States, seem to be repugnant to the declarations we find everywhere that an overt act must be laid, and must be proved. No case is cited by Hale in support of them, and I am strongly inclined to the opinion that had the public received his corrected instead of his original manuscript, they would, if not expunged, have been restrained in their application to cases of a particular description. Laid down generally, and applied universally to all cases of treason, they are repugnant to the principles for which Hale contends, for which all the elementary writers contend, and from which courts have in no case, either directly reported or referred to in the books, ever departed. These principles are, that the indictment must give notice of the offence; that the accused is only bound to answer the particular charge which the indictment contains, and that the overt act laid is that particular charge. Under such circumstances, it is only doing justice to Hale to examine his dicta, and if they admit of being understood in a limited sense, not repugnant to his own doctrines nor to the general principles of law, to understand them in that sense. "If many conspire to counterfeit, or counsel or abet it, and one of them doth the fact upon that couselling or conspiracy, it is treason in all, and they may be all indicted for counterfeiting generally within this statute, for in such case in treason all are principals." This is laid down as applicable singly to the treason of counterfeiting the coin, and is not applied by Hale to other treasons. Had he designed to apply the principle universally he would have stated it as a general proposition; he would have laid it down in treating on other branches of the statute as well as in the chapter respecting the coin; he would have laid it down when treating on indictments generally. But he has done neither. Every sentiment bearing in any manner on this point, which is to be found in Lord Hale while on the doctrine of levying war or on the general doctrine of indictments, militates against the opinion that he considered the proposition as more extensive than he has declared it to be. No court could be justified in extending the dictum of a judge beyond its terms to cases which he had expressly treated, in which he has not himself applied it, and on which he, as well as others, has delivered opinions which that dictum would overrule. This would be the less justifiable if there should be a clear legal distinction indicated by the very terms in which the judge has expressed himself between the particular case to which alone he has applied the dictum and other cases to which the court is required to extend it. There is this clear legal distinction: "They may," says Judge Hale, "be indicted for counterfeiting generally." But if many conspire to levy war, and some actually levy it, they may not be indicted for levying war generally. The books concur in declaring that they cannot be so indicted. A special overt act of levying war must be laid. This distinction between counterfeiting the coins and that class of treasons among which levying war is placed is taken in the statute of Edward III. That statute requires an overt act of levying war to be laid in the indictment, and does not require an overt act of counterfeiting the coin to be laid. If in a particular case, in which a general indictment is sufficient, it be stated that the crime may be charged generally according to the legal effect of the act, it does not follow that in other cases, where a general indictment would not be sufficient, where an overt act must be laid, that this overt act need not be laid according to the real fact. Hale, then, is to be reconciled to himself and with the general principles of the law only be permitting the limits which he has himself given to his own dictum to remain where he has placed them. In page 238, Hale is speaking generally to the receiver of a traitor, and is stating in what such a receiver partakes of an accessory: 1st. "His indictment must be special of the receipt, and not generally that he did the thing, which may be otherwise in case of one that is procurer, counsellor, or consenter." The words "may be otherwise" do not clearly convey the idea that it is universally otherwise. In all cases of receiver, the indictment must be special on the receipt, and not general. The words "may be otherwise in case of a procurer," &c., signify that it may be otherwise in all treasons, or that it may be otherwise in some treasons. If it may be otherwise in some treasons without contradicting the doctrines of Hale himself as well as of other writers, but cannot be otherwise in all treasons without such contradiction, the fair construction is, that Hale used these words in their restricted sense; that he used them in reference to treasons in which a general indictment would lie, not to treasons where a general indictment would not lie, but an overt act of the treason must be charged. The two passages of Hale thus construed may, perhaps, be law, and may leave him consistent with himself. It appears to the court to be the fair way of construing them.
These observations relative to the passages quoted from Hale apply to that quoted from East, who obviously copies from Hale and relies upon his authority. Upon this point, J. Kelyng, 26, and 1 Hale, P. C. p. 626, have also been relied upon. It is stated in both that if a man be indicted as a principal and acquitted, he cannot afterwards be indicted as an accessory before the fact--whence it is inferred, not without reason, that evidence of accessorial guilt may be received on such an indictment. Yet no case is found in which the question has been made and decided. The objection has never been taken at a trial and overruled nor do the books say it would be overruled. Were such a case produced its application would be questionable. Kelyng says an accessory before the fact is quodam modo in some manner guilty of the fact. The law may not require that the manner should be stated, for in felony it does not require that an overt act should be laid. The indictment, therefore, may be general; but an overt act of levying war must be laid. These cases, then, prove in their utmost extent no more than the cases previously cited from Hale and East. This distinction between indictments which may state the fact generally, and those which must lay it specially, bear some analogy to a general and a special action on the case. In a general action the declaration may lay the assumpsit according to the legal effect of the transaction, but in a special action on the case the declaration must state the material circumstances truly, and they must be proved as stated. This distinction also derives some aid from a passage in Hale (page 625) immediately preceding that which has been cited at the bar. He says: "If A be indicted as principal and B as accessory before or after, and both be acquitted, yet B may be indicted as principal, and the former acquittal as accessory is no bar." The crimes, then, are not the same, and may not indifferently be tried under the same indictment. But why is it that an acquittal as principal may be pleaded in bar to an indictment as accessory, while an acquittal as accessory may not be pleaded in bar to an indictment as principal? If it be answered that the accessorial crime may be given in evidence on an indictment as principal, but that the principal crime may not be given in evidence on an indictment as accessory, the question recurs, on what legal ground does this distinction stand? I can imagine only this: an accessory being quodam modo a principal in indictments where the law does not require the manner to be stated, which need not be special, evidence of accessorial guilt, if the punishment be the same, may possibly be received; but every indictment as accessory must be special. The very allegation that he is an accessory must be a special allegation, and must show how he became an accessory. The charges of this special indictment, therefore, must be proved as laid, and no evidence which proves the crime in a form substantially different can be received. If this be the legal reason for the distinction, it supports the exposition of these dicta which has been given. If it be not the legal reason, I can conceive no other.
But suppose the law to be as is contended by the counsel for the United States. Suppose an indictment charging an individual with personally assembling among others, and thus levying war, may be satisfied with the proof that he caused the assemblage. What effect will this law have upon this case? The guilt of the accused, if there be any guilt, does not consist in the assemblage, for he was not a member of it. The simple fact of assemblage no more affects one absent man than another. His guilt; then, consists in procuring the assemblage, and upon this fact depends his criminality. The proof relative to the character of an assemblage must be the same whether a man be present or absent. In the general, to charge any individual with the guilt of an assemblage, the fact of his presence must be proved; it constitutes an essential part of the overt act. If, then, the procurement be substituted in the place of presence, does it not also constitute an essential part of the overt act? Must it not also be proved? Must it not be proved in the same manner that presence must be proved? If in one case the presence of the individual make the guilt of the assemblage his guilt, and in the other case the procurement by the individual make the guilt of the assemblage his guilt, then presence and procurement are equally component parts of the overt act, and equally require two witnesses. Collateral points may, say the books, be proved according to the course of the common law; but is this a collateral point? Is the fact, without which the accused does not participate in the guilt of the assemblage if it was guilty, a collateral point? This cannot be. The presence of the party, where presence is necessary, being a part of the overt act, must be positively proved by two witnesses. No presumptive evidence, no facts from which presence may be conjectured or inferred, will satisfy the constitution and the law. If procurement take the place of presence and become part of the overt act, then no presumptive evidence, no facts from which the procurement may be conjectured or inferred, can satisfy the constitution and the law. The mind is not to be led to the conclusion that the individual was present by a train of conjectures, of inferences, or of reasoning; the fact must be proved by two witnesses. Neither, where procurement supplies the want of presence, is the mind to be conducted to the conclusion that the accused procured the assembly by a train of conjectures or inferences, or of reasoning; the fact itself must be proved by two witnesses, and must have been committed within the district. If it be said that the advising or procurement of treason is a secret transaction, which can scarcely ever be proved in the manner required by this opinion, the answer which will readily suggest itself is, that the difficulty of proving a fact will not justify conviction without proof. Certainly it will not justify conviction without a direct and positive witness in a case where the constitution requires two. The more correct inference from this circumstance would seem to be, that the advising of the fact is not within the constitutional definition of the crime. To advise or procure a treason is in the nature of conspiring or plotting treason, which is not treason in itself. If, then, the doctrines of Kelyng, Hale, and East, be understood in the sense in which they are pressed by the counsel for the prosecution, and are applicable in the United States, the fact that the accused procured the assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island must be proved, not circumstantially, but positively, by two witnesses, to charge him with that assemblage. But there are still other most important considerations which must be well weighed before this doctrine can be applied to the United States.
The 8th [6th] amendment to the constitution has been pressed with great force, and it is impossible not to feel its application to this point. The accused cannot be said to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation" unless the indictment give him that notice which may reasonably suggest to him the point on which the accusation turns, so that he may know the course to be pursued in his defence. It is also well worthy of consideration, that this doctrine, so far as it respects treason, is entirely supported by the operation of the common law, which is said to convert the accessory before the fact into the principal, and to make the act of the principal his act. The accessory before the fact is not said to have levied war. He is not said to be guilty under the statute, but the common law attaches to him the guilt of that fact which he has advised or procured; and, as contended, makes it his act. This is the operation of the common law, not the operation of the statute. It is an operation, then, which can only be performed where the common law exists to perform it. It is the creature of the common law, and the creature presupposes its creator. To decide, then, that this doctrine is applicable to the United States would seem to imply the decision that the United States, as a nation, have a common law which creates and defines the punishment of crimes accessorial in their nature. It would imply the further decision that these accessorial crimes are not, in the case of treason, excluded by the definition of treason given in the constitution. I will not pretend that I have not individually an opinion on these points; but it is one which I should give only in a case which absolutely required it, unless I could confer respecting it with the judges of the supreme court.
I have said that this doctrine cannot apply to the United States without implying those decisions respecting the common law which I have stated; because, should it be true, as is contended, that the constitutional definition of treason comprehends him who advises or procures an assemblage that levies war, it would not follow that such adviser or procurer might be charged as having been present at the assemblage. If the adviser or procurer be within the definition of levying war, and, independent of the agency of the common law, do actually levy war, then the advisement or procurement is an overt act of levying war. If it be the overt act on which he is to be convicted, then it must be charged in the indictment; for he can only be convicted on proof of the overt acts which are charged. To render this distinction more intelligible, let it be recollected that, although it should be conceded that since the statute of William and Mary he who advises or procures a treason may, in England, be charged as having committed that treason, by virtue of the common law operation, which is said, so far as respects the indictment, to unite the accessorial to the principal offence and permit them to be charged as one, yet it can never be conceded that he who commits one overt act under the statute of Edward can be charged and convicted on proof of another overt act. If, then, procurement be an overt act of treason under the constitution, no man can be convicted for the procurement under an indictment charging him with actually assembling, whatever may be the doctrine of the common law in the case of an accessorial offender.
It may not be improper in this place again to advert to the opinion of the supreme court, and to show that it contains nothing contrary to the doctrine now laid down. That opinion is, that an individual may be guilty of treason "who has not appeared in arms against his country; that if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a treasonable object, all those who perform any part, however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as traitors." This opinion does not touch the case of a person who advises or procures an assemblage, and does nothing further. The advising, certainly, and perhaps the procuring, is more in the nature of a conspiracy to levy war than of the actual levying of war. According to the opinion, it is not enough to be leagued in the conspiracy, and that war be levied, but it is also necessary to perform a part: that part is the act of levying war. That part, it is true, may be minute, it may not be the actual appearance in arms, and it may be remote from the scene of action, that is, from the place where the army is assembled; but it must be a part, and that part must be performed by a person who is leagued in the conspiracy. This part, however minute or remote, constitutes the overt act of which alone the person who performs it can be convicted. The opinion does not declare that the person who has performed this remote and minute part may be indicted for a part which was, in truth, performed by others, and convicted on their overt acts. it amounts to this and nothing more, that when war is actually levied, not only those who bear arms, but those also who are leagued in the conspiracy, and who perform the various distinct parts which are necessary for the prosecution of war, do, in the sense of the constitution, levy war. It may possibly be the opinion of the supreme court that those who procure a treason and do nothing further are guilty under the constitution. I only say that opinion has not yet been given, still less has it been indicated that he who advises shall be indicted as having performed the fact.
It is, then, the opinion of the court that this indictment can be supported only by testimony which proves the accused to have been actually or constructively present when the assemblage took place on Blennerhassett's Island; or by the admission of the doctrine that he who procures an act may be indicted as having performed that act.
It is further the opinion of the court that there is no testimony whatever which tends to prove that the accused was actually or constructively present when that assemblage did take place; indeed, the contrary is most apparent. With respect to admitting proof of procurement to establish a charge of actual presence, the court is of opinion that if this be admissible in England on an indictment for levying war, which is far from being conceded, it is admissible only by virtue of the operation of the common law upon the statute, and therefore is not admissible in this country unless by virtue of a similar operation--a point far from being established, but on which, for the present, no opinion is given. If, however, this point be established, still the procurement must be proved in the same manner and by the same kind of testimony which would be required to prove actual presence.
The second point in this division of the subject is the necessity of adducing the record of the previous conviction of some one person who committed the fact alleged to be treasonable. This point presupposes the treason of the accused, if any have been committed, to be accessorial in its nature. Its being of this description, according to the British authorities, depends on the presence or absence of the accused at the time the fact was committed. The doctrine on this subject is well understood, has been most copiously explained, and need not be repeated. That there is no evidence of his actual or legal presence is a point already discussed and decided. It is, then, apparent that but for the exception to the general principle which is made in cases of treason, those who assembled at Blennerhassett's Island, if that assemblage were such as to constitute the crime, would be principals, and those who might really have caused that assemblage, although in truth the chief traitors, would in law be accessories. It is a settled principle in the law that the accessory cannot be guilty of a greater offence than his principal. The maxim is "Accessorius sequitur naturam sui principalis"--"The accessory follows the nature of his principal." Hence results the necessity of establishing the guilt of the principal before the accessory can be tried; for the degree of guilt which is incurred by counselling or commanding the commission of a crime depends upon the actual commission of that crime. No man is an accessory to murder unless the fact has been committed. The fact can only be established in a prosecution against the person by whom a crime has been perpetrated. The law supposes a man more capable of defending his own conduct than any other person, and will not tolerate that the guilt of A shall be established in a prosecution against B. Consequently, if the guilt of B depends on the guilt of A, A must be convicted before B can be tried. It would exhibit a monstrous deformity indeed in our system, if B might be executed for being accessory to a murder committed by A, and A should afterwards, upon a full trial, be acquitted of the fact. For this obvious reason, although the punishment of a principal and accessory was originally the same, and although in many instances it is still the same, the accessory could in no case be tried before the conviction of his principal, nor can he yet be tried previous to such conviction, unless he require it, or unless a special provision to that effect be made by statute. If, then, this were a felony, the prisoner at the bar could not be tried until the crime were established by the conviction of the person by whom it was actually perpetrated.
Is the law otherwise in this case, because in treason all are principals? Let this question be answered by reason and by authority. Why is it that in felonies, however atrocious, the trial of the accessory can never precede the conviction of the principal? Not because the one is denominated the principal and the other the accessory; for that would be ground on which a great law principle could never stand. Not because there was, in fact, a difference in the degree of moral guilt; for in the case of murder committed by a hardy villain for a bribe, the person plotting the murder and giving the bribe is, perhaps, of the two, the blacker criminal; and were it otherwise, this would furnish no argument for precedence in trial. What, then, is the reason? It has been already given. The legal guilt of the accessory depends on the guilt of the principal; and the guilt of the principal can only be established in a prosecution against himself. Does not this reason apply in full force to a case of treason? The legal guilt of the person who planned the assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island depends not simply on the criminality of the previous conspiracy, but on the criminality of that assemblage. If those who perpetrated the fact be not traitors, he who advised the fact cannot be a traitor. His guilt, then, in contemplation of law, depends on theirs; and their guilt can only be established in a prosecution against themselves. Whether the adviser of this assemblage be punishable with death as a principal or as an accessory, his liability to punishment depends on the degree of guilt attached to an act which has been perpetrated by others; and which, if it be a criminal act, renders them guilty also. His guilt, therefore, depends on theirs; and their guilt cannot be legally established in a prosecution against him.
The whole reason of the law, then, relative to the principal and accessory, so far as respects the order of trial, seems to apply in full force to a case of treason committed by one body of men in conspiracy with others who are absent. If from reason we pass to authority, we find it laid down by Hale, Foster, and East, in the most explicit terms, that the conviction of some one who has committed the treason must precede the trial of him who has advised or procured it. This position is also maintained by Leach in his notes on Hawkins, and is not, so far as the court has discovered, anywhere contradicted. These authorities have been read and commented on at such length that it cannot be necessary for the court to bring them again into view. It is the less necessary because it is not understood that the law is controverted by the counsel for the United States. It is, however, contended that the prisoner has waived his right to demand the conviction of some one person who was present at the fact, by pleading to his indictment. Had this indictment even charged the prisoner according to the truth of the case, the court would feel some difficulty in deciding that he had, by implication, waived his right to demand a species of testimony essential to his conviction. The court is not prepared to say that the act which is to operate against his rights did not require that it should be performed with a full knowledge of its operation. It would seem consonant to the usual course of proceeding in other respects in criminal cases, that the prisoner should be informed that he had a right to refuse to be tried until some person who committed the act should be convicted; and that he ought not to be considered as waiving the right to demand the record of conviction, unless with the full knowledge of that right he consented to be tried. The court, however, does not decide what the law would be in such a case. It is unnecessary to decide it; because pleading to an indictment, in which a man is charged as having committed an act, cannot be construed to waive a right which he would have possessed had he been charged with having advised the act. No person indicted as a principal can be expected to say, "I am not a principal. I am an accessory. I did not commit, I only advised the act."
The authority of the English cases on this subject depends, in a great measure, on the adoption of the common law doctrine of accessorial treasons. If that doctrine be excluded, this branch of it may not be directly applicable to treasons committed within the United States. If the crime of advising or procuring a levying of war be within the constitutional definition of treason, then he who advises or procures it must be indicted on the very fact; and the question whether the treasonableness of the act may be decided in the first instance in the trial of him who procured it, or must be decided in the trial of one who committed it, will depend upon the reason, as it respects the law of evidence, which produced the British decisions with regard to the trial of principal and accessory, rather than on the positive authority of those decisions. This question is not essential in the present case; because if the crime be within the constitutional definition, it is an overt act of levying war, and, to produce a conviction, ought to have been charged in the indictment.
The law of the case being thus far settled, what ought to be the decision of the court on the present motion? Ought the court to sit and hear testimony which cannot affect the prisoner, or ought the court to arrest that testimony? On this question much has been said--much that may perhaps be ascribed to a misconception of the point really under consideration. The motion has been treated as a motion confessedly made to stop irrelevant testimony; and, in the course of the argument, it has been repeatedly stated, by those who oppose the motion, that irrelevant testimony may and ought to be stopped. That this statement is perfectly correct is one of those fundamental principles in judicial proceedings which is acknowledged by all, and is founded in the absolute necessity of the thing. No person will contend that, in a civil or criminal case, either party is at liberty to introduce what testimony he pleases, legal or illegal, and to consume the whole term in details of facts unconnected with the particular case. Some tribunal, then, must decide on the admissibility of testimony. The parties cannot constitute this tribunal; for they do not agree. The jury cannot constitute it; for the question is whether they shall hear the testimony or not. Who, then, but the court can constitute it? It is of necessity the peculiar province of the court to judge of the admissibility of testimony. If the court admit improper or reject proper testimony, it is an error of judgment; but it is an error committed in the direct exercise of their judicial functions. The present indictment charges the prisoner with levying war against the United States, and alleges an overt act of levying war. That overt act must be proved, according to the mandates of the constitution and of the act of congress, by two witnesses. It is not proved by a single witness. The presence of the accused has been stated to be an essential component part of the overt act in this indictment, unless the common law principle respecting accessories should render it unnecessary; and there is not only no witness who has proved his actual or legal presence, but the fact of his absence is not controverted. The counsel for the prosecution offer to give in evidence subsequent transactions at a different place and in a different state, in order to prove--what? The overt act laid in the indictment? That the prisoner was one of those who assembled at Blennerhassett's Island? No: that is not alleged. It is well known that such testimony is not competent to establish such a fact. The constitution and law require that the fact should be established by two witnesses; not by the establishment of other facts from which the jury might reason to this fact. The testimony, then, is not relevant. If it can be introduced, it is only in the character of corroborative or confirmatory testimony, after the overt act has been proved by two witnesses in such manner that the question of fact ought to be left with the jury. The conclusion that in this state of things no testimony can be admissible is so inevitable that the counsel for the United States could not resist it. I do not understand them to deny that, if the overt act be not proved by two witnesses so as to be submitted to the jury, all other testimony must be irrelevant; because no other testimony can prove the act. Now, an assemblage on Blennerhassett's Island is proved by the requisite number of witnesses; and the court might submit it to the jury whether that assemblage amounted to a levying of war; but the presence of the accused at that assemblage being nowhere alleged except in the indictment, the overt act is not proved by a single witness; and, of consequence, all other testimony must be irrelevant. The only difference between this motion as made, and the motion in the form which the counsel for the United States would admit to be regular, is this: It is now general for the rejection of all testimony. It might be particular with respect to each witness as adduced. But can this be wished, or can it be deemed necessary? If enough be proved to show that the indictment cannot be supported, and that no testimony, unless it be of that description which the attorney for the United States declares himself not to possess, can be relevant, why should a question be taken on each witness? The opinion of this court on the order of testimony has frequently been adverted to as deciding this question against the motion. If a contradiction between the two opinions exist, the court cannot perceive it. It was said that levying war is an act compounded of law and fact, of which the jury, aided by the court, must judge. To that declaration the court still adheres. It was said that if the overt act were not proved by two witnesses, no testimony in its nature corroborative or confirmatory was admissible, or could be relevant. From that declaration there is certainly no departure. It has been asked, in allusion to the present case, if a general commanding an army should detach troops for a distant service, would the men composing that detachment be traitors, and would the commander-in-chief escape punishment? Let the opinion which has been given answer this question. Appearing at the head of an army would, according to this opinion, be an overt act of levying war. Detaching a military corps from it for military purposes might, also, be an overt act of levying war. It is not pretended that he would not be punishable for these acts. It is only said that he may be tried and convicted on his own acts in the state where those acts were committed, not on the acts of others in the state where those others acted.
Much has been said in the course of the argument on points on which the court feels no inclination to comment particularly; but which may, perhaps not improperly, receive some notice. That this court dares not usurp power is most true. That this court dares not shrink from its duty is not less true. No man is desirous of placing himself in a disagreeable situation. No man is desirous of becoming the peculiar subject of calumny. No man might he let the bitter cup pass from him without self-reproach, would drain it to the bottom. But if he have no choice in the case, if there be no alternative presented to him but a dereliction of duty or the opprobrium of those who are denominated the world, he merits the contempt as well as the indignation of his country who can hesitate which to embrace. That gentlemen, in a case the most interesting, in the zeal with which they advocate particular opinions, and under the conviction in some measure produced by that zeal, should, on each side, press their arguments too far, should be impatient at any deliberation in the court, and should suspect or fear the operation of motives to which alone they can ascribe that deliberation, is, perhaps, a frailty incident to human nature; but if any conduct on the part of the court could warrant a sentiment that it would deviate to the one side or the other from the line prescribed by duty and by law, that conduct would be viewed by the judges themselves with an eye of extreme severity, and would long be recollected with deep and serious regret.
The arguments on both sides have been intently and deliberately considered. Those which could not be noticed, since to notice every argument and authority would swell this opinion to a volume, have not been disregarded. The result of the whole is a conviction, as complete as the mind of the court is capable of receiving on a complex subject, that the motion must prevail. No testimony relative to the conduct or declarations of the prisoner elsewhere, and subsequent to the transaction on Blennerhassett's Island, can be admitted; because such testimony, being in its nature merely corroborative and incompetent to prove the overt act in itself, is irrelevant until there be proof of the overt act by two witnesses. This opinion does not comprehend the proof by two witnesses that the meeting on Blennerhassett's Island was procured by the prisoner. On that point the court for the present withholds its opinion for reasons which have been already assigned; and as it is understood from the statements made on the part of the prosecution that no such testimony exists, if there be such let it be offered, and the court will decide upon it.
The jury have now heard the opinion of the court on the law of the case. They will apply that law to the facts, and will find a verdict of guilty or not guilty as their own consciences may direct.
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