Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance2 Dall. 304 C.C.D.Pa. 1795
[Paterson, J.] I. The constitutionality of the confirming act; or, in other words, whether the legislature had authority to make that act?
Legislation is the exercise of sovereign authority. High and important powers are necessarily vested in the legislative body; whose acts, under some forms of government, are irresistible and subject to no control. In England, from whence most of our legal principles and legislative notions are derived, the authority of the Parliament is transcendent and has no bounds. "The power and jurisdiction of Parliament," says Sir Edward Coke, "is so transcendent and absolute, that it cannot be confined, either for causes or persons, within any bounds. And of this high court, he adds, it may be truly said, si antiquitatem spectes, est vetussissima; si dignitatem, est honoratissima; si jurisdictionem, est capacissima. It has sovereign and uncontrollable authority in the making, confirming, enlarging, restraining, abrogating, repealing, reviving and expounding of laws, concerning matters of all possible denominations, ecclesiastical or temporal, civil, military, maritime or criminal: this being the place where that absolute despotic power, which must in all governments reside somewhere, is intrusted by the constitution of these kingdoms. All mischiefs and grievances, operations and remedies that transcend the ordinary course of the laws, are within the reach of this extraordinary tribunal. It can regulate or new model the succession to the crown; as was done in the reign of Henry VIII. and William III. It can alter the established religion of the land; as was done in a variety of instances, in the reigns of king Henry VIII. and his three children. It can change and create afresh even the constitution of the kingdom and of parliaments themselves; as was done by the act of union, and the several statutes for triennial and septennial elections. It can, in short, do everything that is not naturally impossible; and therefore, some have not scrupled to call its power, by a figure rather too bold, the omnipotence of parliament. True it is, that what the parliament doth, no authority upon earth can undo." (1 Bl. Com. 160.)
From this passage, it is evident, that, in England, the authority of the parliament runs without limits, and rises above control. It is difficult to say, what the constitution of England is; because, not being reduced to written certainty and precision, it lies entirely at the mercy of the parliament: it bends to every governmental exigency; it varies and is blown about by every breeze of legislative humor or political caprice. Some of the judges in England have had the boldness to assert, that an act of parliament, made against natural equity, is void; but this opinion contravenes the general position, that the validity of an act of parliament cannot be drawn into question by the judicial department: it cannot be disputed, and must be obeyed. The power of parliament is absolute and transcendent; it is omnipotent in the scale of political existence. Besides, in England, there is no written constitution, no fundamental law, nothing visible, nothing real, nothing certain, by which a statute can be tested. In America, the case is widely different: every state in the Union has its constitution reduced to written exactitude and precision.
What is a Constitution? It is the form of government, delineated by the mighty hand of the people, in which certain first principles of fundamental laws are established. The constitution is certain and fixed; it contains the permanent will of the people, and is the supreme law of the land; it is paramount to the power of the legislature, and can be revoked or altered only by the authority that made it. The life-giving principle and the death-doing stroke must proceed from the same hand. What are legislatures? Creatures of the constitution; they owe their existence to the constitution: they derive their powers from the constitution: it is their commission; and therefore, all their acts must be conformable to it, or else they will be void. The constitution is the work or will of the people themselves, in their original, sovereign and unlimited capacity. Law is the work or will of the legislature, in their derivative and subordinate capacity. The one is the work of the creator, and the other of the creature. The constitution fixes limits to the exercise of legislative authority, and prescribes the orbit within which it must move. In short, gentlemen, the constitution is the sun of the political system, around which all legislative, executive and judicial bodies must revolve. Whatever may be the case in other countries, yet, in this, there can be no doubt, that every act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is absolutely void.
In the second article of the declaration of rights, which was made part of the late constitution of Pennsylvania, it is declared: "That all men have a natural and unalienable right to worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their own consciences and understanding; and that no man ought, or of right can be, compelled to attend any religious worship, or erect or support any place of worship, or maintain any ministry, contrary to, or against, his own free will and consent; nor can any man, who acknowledges the being of a God, be justly deprived or abridged of any civil right as a citizen, on account of his religious sentiments, or peculiar mode of religious worship; and that no authority can, or ought to be, vested in, or assumed, by any power whatever, that shall, in any case, interfere with, or in any manner control, the right of conscience in the free exercise of religious worship." (Dec. of Rights, Art. II.)
In the thirty-second section of the same constitution, it is ordained; "that all elections, whether by the people or in general assembly, shall be by ballot, free and voluntary." (Const. Penn. § 32.)
Could the legislature have annulled these articles, respecting religion, the rights of conscience, and elections by ballot? Surely no. As to these points, there was no devolution of power; the authority was purposely withheld, and reserved by the people to themselves. If the legislature had passed an act declaring, that, in future, there should be no trial by jury, would it have been obligatory? No: it would have been void for want of jurisdiction, or constitutional extent of power. The right of trial by jury is a fundamental law, made sacred by the constitution, and cannot be legislated away. The constitution of a state is stable and permanent, not to be worked upon by the temper of the times, nor to rise and fall with the tide of events: notwithstanding the competition of opposing interests, and the violence of contending parties, it remains firm and immovable, as a mountain amidst the strife of storms, or a rock in the ocean amidst the raging of the waves. I take it to be a clear position; that if a legislative act oppugns a constitutional principle, the former must give way, and be rejected on the score of repugnance. I hold it to be a position equally clear and sound, that, in such case, it will be the duty of the court to adhere to the constitution, and to declare the act null and void. The constitution is the basis of legislative authority; it lies at the foundation of all law, and is a rule and commission by which both legislators and judges are to proceed. It is an important principle, which, in the discussion of questions of the present kind, ought never to be lost sight of, that the judiciary in this country is not a subordinate, but co-ordinate, branch of the government.
Having made these preliminary observations, we shall proceed to contemplate the quieting and confirming act, and to bring its validity to the test of the constitution. In the course of argument, the counsel on both sides relied upon certain parts of the late bill of rights and constitution of Pennsylvania, which I shall now read, and then refer to them occasionally in the sequel of the charge. (The judge then read the 1st, 8th and 11th articles of the declaration of rights; and the 9th and 46th sections of the constitution of Pennsylvania.) (See 1 Dall. Laws, app. p. 55--6, 60.)
From these passages, it is evident, that the right of acquiring and possessing property, and having it protected, is one of the natural, inherent and inalienable rights of man. Men have a sense of property: property is necessary to their subsistence, and correspondent to their natural wants and desires; its security was one of the objects that induced them to unite in society. No man could become a member of a community, in which he could not enjoy the fruits of his honest labor and industry. The preservation of property, then, is a primary object of the social compact, and, by the late constitution of Pennsylvania, was made a fundamental law. Every person ought to contribute his proportion for public purposes and public exigencies; but no one can be called upon to surrender or sacrifice his whole property, real and personal, for the good of the community, without receiving a recompense in value. This would be laying a burden upon an individual, which ought to be sustained by the society at large. The English history does not furnish an instance of the kind; the parliament, with all their boasted omnipotence, never committed such an outrage on private property; and if they had, it would have served only to display the dangerous nature of unlimited authority; it would have been an exercise of power and not of right. Such an act would be a monster in legislation and shock all mankind. The legislature, therefore, had no authority to make an act divesting one citizen of his freehold, and vesting it in another, without a just compensation. It is inconsistent with the principles of reason, justice and moral rectitude; it is incompatible with the comfort, peace and happiness of mankind; it is contrary to the principles of social alliance, in every free government; and lastly, it is contrary both to the letter and spirit of the constitution. In short, it is what every one would think unreasonable and unjust in his own case.
The next step in the line of progression is, whether the legislature had authority to make an act, divesting one citizen of his freehold and vesting it in another, even with compensation? That the legislature, on certain emergencies, had authority to exercise this high power, has been urged from the nature of the social compact, and from the words of the constitution, which says, that the house of representatives shall have all other powers necessary for the legislature of a free state or commonwealth; but they shall have no power to add to, alter, abolish or infringe on any part of this constitution. The course of reasoning, on the part of the defendant, may be comprised in a few words. The despotic power, as it is aptly called by some writers, of taking private property, when state necessity requires, exists in every government; the existence of such power is necessary; government could not subsist without it; and if this be the case, it cannot be lodged anywhere with so much safety as with the legislature. The presumption is, that they will not call it into exercise, except in urgent cases, or cases of the first necessity. There is force in this reasoning. It is, however, difficult to form a case, in which the necessity of a state can be of such a nature, as to authorize or excuse the seizing of landed property belonging to one citizen and giving it to another citizen. It is immaterial to the state, in which of its citizens the land is vested; but it is of primary importance, that, when vested, it should be secured, and the proprietor protected in the enjoyment of it. The constitution encircles and renders it an holy thing.
We must, gentlemen, bear constantly in mind, that the present is a case of landed property; vested by law in one set of citizens, attempted to be divested, for the purpose of vesting the same property in another set of citizens. It cannot be assimilated to the case of personal property taken or used in time of war or famine, or other extreme necessity; it cannot be assimilated to the temporary possession of land itself, on a pressing public emergency, or the spur of the occasion. In the latter case, there is no change of property, no divestment of right; the title remains, and the proprietor, though out of possession for a while, is still proprietor and lord of the soil. The possession grew out of the occasion and ceases with it: then the right of necessity is satisfied and at an end; it does not affect the title, is temporary in its nature, and cannot exist for ever. The constitution expressly declares, that the right of acquiring, possessing and protecting property is natural, inherent, and inalienable. It is a right not ex gratiâ from the legislature, but ex debito from the constitution. It is sacred; for it is further declared, that the legislature shall have no power to add to, alter, abolish or infringe any part of the constitution. The constitution is the origin and measure of legislative authority. It says to legislators, thus far ye shall go and no farther. Not a particle of it should be shaken; not a pebble of it should be removed. Innovation is dangerous; one encroachment leads to another; precedent gives birth to precedent; what has been done may be done again; thus radical principles are generally broken in upon, and the constitution eventually destroyed. Where is the security, where the inviolability of property, if the legislature, by a private act, affecting particular persons only, can take land from one citizen, who acquired it legally, and vest it in another? The rights of private property are regulated, protected and governed by general, known and established laws; and decided upon by general, known and established tribunals; laws and tribunals not made and created on an instant exigency, on an urgent emergency, to serve a present turn, or the interest of a moment. Their operation and influence are equal and universal; they press alike on all. Hence, security and safety, tranquillity and peace. One man is not afraid of another, and no man afraid of the legislature. It is infinitely wiser and safer, to risk some possible mischiefs, than to vest in the legislature so unnecessary, dangerous and enormous a power as that which has been exercised on the present occasion; a power that, according to the full extent of the argument, is boundless and omnipotent: for the legislature judged of the necessity of the case, and also of the nature and value of the equivalent.
Such a case of necessity; and judging, too, of the compensation, can never occur in any nation. Singular, indeed, and untoward must be the state of things, that would induce the legislature, supposing they had the power, to divest one individual of his landed estate, merely for the purpose of vesting it in another, even upon full indemnification; unless that indemnification be ascertained in the manner which I shall mention hereafter.
But admitting, that the legislature can take the real estate of A. and give it to B., on making compensation, the principle and reasoning upon it go no further than to show, that the legislature are the sole and exclusive judges of the necessity of the case, in which this despotic power should be called into action. It cannot, on the principles of the social alliance, or of the constitution, be extended beyond the point of judging upon every existing case of necessity. The legislature declare and enact, that such are the public exigencies, or necessities of the state, as to authorize them to take the land of A. and give it to B.; the dictates of reason and the eternal principles of justice, as well as the sacred principles of the social contract, and the constitution, direct, and they accordingly declare and ordain, that A. shall receive compensation for the land. But here the legislature must stop; they have run the full length of their authority, and can go no further: they cannot constitutionally determine upon the amount of the compensation, or value of the land. Public exigencies do not require, necessity does not demand, that the legislature should, of themselves, without the participation of the proprietor, or intervention of a jury, assess the value of the thing, or ascertain the amount of the compensation to be paid for it. This can constitutionally be effected only in three ways. 1. By the parties--that is, by stipulation between the legislature and proprietor of the land. 2. By commissioners mutually elected by the parties. 3. By the intervention of a jury.
The compensatory part of the act lies in the ninth section. "And whereas, the late proprietaries, and divers other persons, have heretofore acquired titles to parcels of the land aforesaid, agreeably to the laws and usages of Pennsylvania, and who will be deprived thereof by the operation of this act, and as justice requires that compensation be made for the lands, of which they shall be thus divested; and as the state is possessed of other lands, in which an equivalent may be rendered to the claimants under Pennsylvania, and as it will be necessary, that their claims should be ascertained by a proper examination: Be it, therefore, enacted by the authority aforesaid, that all persons having such claims to lands, which will be affected by the operation of this act, shall be, and they are hereby required, by themselves, guardians, or other lawful agents, within twelve months from the passing of this act, to present the same to the board of property, therein clearly describing those lands, and stating the grounds of their claims, and also adducing the proper proofs, not only of their titles, but of the situations, qualities and values of the land so claimed, to enable the board to judge of the validity of their claims, and of the quantities of vacant lands proper to be granted as equivalents. And for every claim which shall be admitted by said board, as duly supported, the equivalent by them allowed, may be taken either in the old or new purchase, at the option of the claimant; and warrants and patents, and all other acts of the public offices relating thereto, shall be performed free of expense. The said board shall also allow such a quantity of vacant land, to be added to such equivalent, as shall, in their judgment, be equal to the expenses, which must necessarily be incurred in locating and surveying the same. And that the board of property may in every case, obtain satisfactory evidence of the quality and value of the land, which shall be claimed as aforesaid, under the proprietary title, they may require the commissioners aforesaid, during their sitting in the county of Luzerne, to make the necessary inquiries, by the oaths or affirmations of lawful witnesses, to ascertain those points; and it shall be the duty of the said commissioners to inquire and report accordingly." (Act of 28th March 1787, § 9. P. L. 274.)
In this section, two things are worthy of consideration. 1. The mode or manner, in which compensation for the lands is to be ascertained. 2. The nature of the compensation itself.
The Pennsylvania claimants are directed to present their claims to the board of property--and what is the board to do thereupon? Why, it is--1. To judge of the validity of their claims. 2. To ascertain, by the aid and through the medium of commissioners, appointed by the legislature, the quality and value of the land. 3. To judge of the quality of vacant land to be granted as an equivalent.
This is not the constitutional line of procedure. I have already observed, that there are but three modes, in which matters of this kind can be concluded, consistently with the principles and spirit of the constitution, and social alliance. The first of which is by the parties, that is to say, by the legislature and proprietor of the land. Of this the British history presents an illustrious example in the case of the Isle of Man.
"The distinct jurisdiction of this little subordinate royalty being found inconvenient for the purposes of public justice, and for the revenue (it affording a commodious asylum for debtors, outlaws and smugglers), authority was given to the treasury, by statute 12 Geo. I., c. 28, to purchase the interest of the then proprietors, for the use of the crown; which purchase was at length completed in the year 1765, and confirmed by statutes 5 Geo. III., c. 26 and 38, whereby the whole island and all its dependencies, so granted as aforesaid (except the landed property of the Atholl family, their manorial rights and emoluments, and the patronage of bishoprics, and other ecclesiastical benefices) are inalienably vested in the crown, and subjected to the regulations of the British excise and customs." 1 Bl. Com. 107.
Shame to American legislation! That in England, a limited monarchy, where there is no written constitution, where the parliament is omnipotent, and can mould the constitution at pleasure, a more sacred regard should have been paid to property, than in America, surrounded as we are with a blaze of political illumination; where the legislatures are limited; where we have republican governments, and written constitutions, by which the protection and enjoyment of property are rendered inviolable. The case of the Isle of Man was a fair and honorable stipulation; it partook of the spirit and essence of a contract; it was free and mutual; and was treating with the proprietors on equal terms.
But if the business cannot be effected in this way, then the value of the land, intended to be taken, should be ascertained by commissioners, or persons mutually elected by the parties, or by the intervention of the judiciary, of which a jury is a component part. In the first case, we approximate nearly to a contract; because the will of the party, whose property is to be affected, is in some degree exercised; he has a choice; his own act co-operates with that of the legislature. In the other case, there is the intervention of a court of law, or, in other words, a jury is to pass between the public and the individual, who, after hearing the proofs and allegations of the parties, will, by their verdict, fix the value of the property, or the sum to be paid for it. The compensation, if not agreed upon by the parties or their agents, must be ascertained by a jury. The interposition of a jury is, in such case, a constitutional guard upon property, and a necessary check to legislative authority. It is a barrier between the individual and the legislature, and ought never to be removed; as long as it is preserved, the rights of private property will be in no danger of violation, except in cases of absolute necessity, or great public utility. By the confirming act, the value of the land taken, and the value of the land to be paid in recompense, are to be ascertained by the board of property. And who are the persons that constitute this board? Men appointed by one of the parties, by the legislature only. The person whose property is to be divested and valued, had no volition, no choice, no co-operation in the appointment; and besides, the other constitutional guard upon property, that of a jury, is removed and done away. The board of property thus constituted, are authorised to decide upon the value of the land to be taken, and upon the value of the land to be given by way of equivalent, without the participation of the party, or the intervention of a jury.
2. The nature of the compensation. By the act, the equivalent is to be in land. No just compensation can be made, except in money. Money is a common standard, by comparison with which the value of anything may be ascertained. It is not only a sign which represents the respective values of commodities, but is an universal medium, easily portable, liable to little variation, and readily exchanged for any kind of property. Compensation is a recompense in value, a quid pro quo, and must be in money. True it is, that land or anything else may be a compensation, but then it must be at the election of the party; it cannot be forced upon him. His consent will legalise the act, and make it valid; nothing short of it will have the effect. It is obvious, that if a jury pass upon the subject, or value of the property, their verdict must be in money.
To close this part of the discourse: It is contended, that the legislature must judge of the necessity of interposing their despotic authority; it is a right of necessity, upon which no other power in government can decide: that no civil institution is perfect; and that cases will occur in which private property must yield to urgent calls of public utility or general danger. Be it so. But then it must be upon complete indemnification to the individual. Agreed, but who shall judge of this? Did there also exist a state necessity, that the legislature, or persons solely appointed by them, must admeasure the compensation, or value of the lands seized and taken, and the validity of the title thereto? Did a third state necessity exist, that the proprietor must take land by way of equivalent for his land? And did a fourth state necessity exist, that the value of this land-equivalent must be adjusted by the board of property, without the consent of the party, or the interference of a jury? Alas! how necessity begets necessity. They rise upon each other and become endless. The proprietor stands afar off, a solitary and unprotected member of the community, and is stripped of his property, without his consent, without a hearing, without notice, the values of that property judged upon, without his participation, or the intervention of a jury, and the equivalent therefor in lands ascertained in the same way. If this be the legislation of a republican government, in which the preservation of property is made sacred by the constitution, I ask, wherein it differs from the mandate of an Asiatic prince? Omnipotence in legislation is despotism. According to this doctrine, we have nothing that we can call our own, or are sure of, for a moment; we are all tenants at will, and hold our landed property at the mere pleasure of the legislature. Wretched situation, precarious tenure! And yet we boast of property and its security, of laws, of courts, of constitutions, and call ourselves free! In short, gentlemen, the confirming act is void; it never had constitutional existence; it is a dead letter, and of no more virtue or avail, than if it never had been made.
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